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TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH: WHY THE
JUDICIARY SHOULD DISREGARD THE
"LAW OF THE CIRCUIT" WHEN

CONFRONTING NONACQUIESCENCE
BY THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
REBECCA HANNER WHITE*

The National Labor Relations Board has been criticizedfor its nonacquiescencepolicy, under which the Boardinterprets the NationalLabor
Relations Act, issues an order, and then defends this orderbefore a circuit court thatpreviously had rejected the Board's interpretationof the
Act. In this Article, ProfessorRebecca White begins by stating that the
NLRB's nonacquiescence policy is both lawful and proper. From this
basic premise, White then argues that courts of appealsshould abandon
the "law of the circuit" doctrine when confronting Board nonacquiescence. She contends the policy concerns that justify application of the
"law of the circuit'--whichinclude providingguidance and certainty to
district courts, lawyers and parties-arenot applicable when a court of
appeals confronts a Board order that conflicts with a prior circuit decision. White concludes that a retreatfrom a rigid applicationof circuit
law in this area would decreaseforum shoppingand increase uniformity
offederal labor law.
In recent years, judicial tempers have flared over the National Labor Relations Board's (the "Board" or the "NLRB") "nonacquiescence" in the "law of
the circuit."' Nonacquiescence occurs when the Board interprets the National
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia. J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky. I
thank my colleagues Dan Coenen, Ellen Jordan, and Paul Kurtz, who read and commented on an
earlier version of this Article.

1. See NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1984); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748 (1lth Cir.
1983); NLRB v. Blackstone Co., Inc., 685 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated, 462 U.S. 1127 (1983);
PPG Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d
208 (2d Cir. 1980); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975
(1980); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp.
v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.
1978).
For a discussion of the trend of nonacquiescence by administrative agencies fueling judicial
resentment, see Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, CroweU v. Benson, andAdministrativeAdjudication, 77
GEo. L.J. 1815 (1989). Professor Schwartz recognizes that court decisions have demonstrated:
palpable judicial anger over this conduct by administrative agencies. The reader is left with
the unmistakable impression that the judges are responding not only to a perceived violation of the rights of private litigants but also to a perceived attack on their own prerogatives as members of the article III judiciary.
Id. at 1823.
Under the "law of the circuit" doctrine, a decision by one panel is binding on all subsequent
panels within the circuit until overruled by the Supreme Court or the circuit court en banc. See infra
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Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA"), issues a conforming order, and then defends it before a circuit court that previously had rejected the Board's interpretation. This nonacquiescence has been criticized despite the broad venue

provisions governing review of NLRB orders, which make it impossible for the
Board, when issuing an order, to know what circuit ultimately will review the
order. 2 In the eyes of the appellate courts, the Board acts outside the law when
it prefers its own view of the Act to that of the circuit that ultimately reviews the
order. 3 The Board, however, has stood its ground, steadfastly maintaining that
it, not the regional courts of appeals, has primary authority to say what the law
4
is in matters involving national labor policy.
Who is correct? Should the Board be required to conform its rulings to the
law of a reviewing court? Or is the Board free to regard circuit court precedent
as informative but not binding?
This Article addresses these questions by first noting that the occasions for
Board nonacquiescence are inflated by the judiciary's unwillingness to accept its
limited role in fashioning national labor law.5 Were the judiciary to stay within
its proper bounds, instances of nonacquiescence would be minimized. 6 Telling
the judiciary to give greater deference to the Board, however, does not resolve
the lawfulness of Board nonacquiescence. 7 This Article resolves this issue by
concluding that nonacquiescence by the NLRB is lawful and proper, both at the
level of agency decisionmaking and at the level of appellate review when the
8
Board advocates its legal position.
notes 212-14 and accompanying text. The appeals courts themselves follow the law of the circuit
when reviewing Board orders and thus become angry when the Board does not consider itself similarly bound by circuit law. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1988). For a discussion of the NLRA's venue provisions and the
uncertainty they provoke in predicting which court will review a particular Board order, see infra
notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
3. See, for example, NLRB v. Blackstone Co., Inc., 685 F.2d 102, 106 n.5 (3d Cir. 1982),
vacated, 462 U.S. 1127 (1983), in which the court considered the Board's failure to follow circuit law
"to be completely improper and reflective of a bureaucratic arrogance which will not be tolerated."
The Third Circuit's view is representative of the appellate courts as a whole. See infra notes 32-42
and accompanying text.
4. See Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. 753, 757 (1987); infra notes 23-31 and accompanying
text.
5. See Kafker, Nonacquiescence by the NLRB: Combat Versus Collaboration,3 LAB. LAW.
137, 150 (1987); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1115
(1987); infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
6. See sources cited supra note 5.
7. A court's impermissible step beyond the proper parameters of judicial review would not
validate otherwise unlawful agency nonacquiescence. Schwartz, supra note 1,at 1902 n.352.

8. Much has been written about the lawfulness of agency nonacquiescence, and most commen.
tators have been critical of the practice. See, eg., Coenen, The ConstitutionalCase Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 Mnmn. L. REv. - (1991) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author);
Diller & Morawetz, IntracircuitNonacquiescenceand the Breakdown of the Rule ofLaw: A Response
to EstreicherandRevesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Dotson & Williamson, NLRB v. The Courts: The

Needfor an Acquiescence Policy at the NLRB, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 739 (1987); Ferguson &
Bordoni, The NLRB vs. The Courts: The Board's Refusal to Acquiesce in the Law of the Federal
CircuitCourts ofAppeals, NYU 35TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 195 (R. Adelman ed. 1982); Kafker, supra note 5; Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence:
The Need for Legislative Curbson Agency Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 399 (1989); Mattson, The
United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB: "Stare Decisis" Only Applies if the Agency Wins, 53
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This conclusion leads to a difficult, and as yet unconfronted issue, which is
the focal point of this Article. If the Board acts lawfully in pursuing its policy of
nonacquiescence, how should the reviewing court respond? If nonacquiescence
is lawful, punitive or "corrective" measures-such as circuit-wide injunctions

restraining nonacquiescence or assessment of attorneys' fees against the Boardare not appropriate. 9 The more subtle question then becomes whether a court of
appeals, which is bound to respect the Board's right to nonacquiesce, nonetheless acts properly in denying enforcement of the Board's orders in knee-jerk reli-

ance on "the law of the circuit."
I conclude that it does not. Rather, the same principles that underlie limited judicial review of Board orders and that legitimate nonacquiescence call for

the abandonment of the "law of the circuit" doctrine when confronting Board
nonacquiescence. Policy concerns that drive "the law of the circuit" doctrine,
such as providing guidance to district courts and certainty to lawyers and parties
within the jurisdiction, simply are not implicated when a Board order is under

review. The retreat from rigid application of circuit law, moreover, would promote other policies by decreasing forum shopping and increasing uniformity of

federal labor law.10

OxLA. BJ. 2561 (1982); Silver & McAvoy, The National LaborRelations Act at the Crossroads,56
FORDHAM L. REv. 181 (1987); Weis, Agency Nonacquiescence-RespectfulLawlessness or Legiti-

mate Disagreement?,48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 845 (1987); Comment, Collateral Esroppel and Nonacquiescence: PrecludingGovernment Litigation in the Pursuitof LitigantEquality, 99 HARV. L. REV. 847
(1986); Note, Administrative Agency IntracircuitNonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 582 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence]; Note, Executive Nonacquiescence: Problems of
StatutoryInterpretationand SeparationofPowers, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1987) [hereinafter Note,
Executive Nonacquiescence]; Note, Denying the PrecedentialEffect of Federal Circuit Court Decisions: Nonacquiescence by Administrative Agencies, 32 WAYNE L. REv. 151 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Denying PrecedentialEffect]. One commentator, while critical of nonacquiescence, does recognize that the NLRB is not wholly at fault in the nonacquiescence debate. Kafker, supra note 5, at
158-59.
Several recent commentators, however, have gone further and recognized that nonacquiescence
by the NLRB is generally lawful. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescenceby FederalAdministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence]; Estreicher & Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against IntracircuitNonacquiescence. A Reply, 99 YALE L. J.
831 (1990) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz, Reply]; Modjeska, The NLRB LitigationalProcesses: A
Response to ChairmanDotson, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 399 (1988); Schwartz, supra note 1; Recent Developments, Administrative Nonacquiescence in JudicialDecisions, 53 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
147 (1984). Commentators, however, do not fully distinguish between nonacquiescence at the
agency and appellate court levels. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of the lawfulness of nonacquiescence, see Maranville, Nonacquiescence:
Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471 (1986); infra
notes 137-202 and accompanying text.
9. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 753. Attorneys' fees were assessed against the Board under the Equal Access to Justice Act when the NLRB's General Counsel
issued a complaint that was unsupported by the law of the circuit that ultimately reviewed the case.
Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 1983). More recently, other courts have
threatened to take remedial action against the Board if nonacquiescence continues, but to date, none
has done so. See, eg., NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Mgt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987); see
also Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 712 n.174 (discussing the recent judicial
threats against the Board).
Outside the NLRB context, the Ninth Circuit has upheld a circuit-wide injunction prohibiting
nonacquiescence by the Social Security Administration. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
10. See infra notes 224-68 and accompanying text.
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This proposal is not without drawbacks. The most prominent and obvious
drawback is a potential increase in judicial workload. This Article questions,
however, how great that increase would be. It also concludes that the benefits of
this proposal outweigh any harms."' The abandonment of the "law of the circuit" doctrine in the distinctive field of labor law is a step toward achieving a
coherent national labor policy, unmarred by needless bickering between the
Board and the courts of appeals.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE NONACQUIESCENCE ISSUE

Orders of the National Labor Relations Board are not self-enforcing. The
circuit courts of appeals are empowered to review Board orders, either on a
petition for enforcement by the Board or on a petition by the aggrieved party
(typically either a union or an employer) to set aside the order.12 Unless the
order is enforced by the reviewing court, parties need not comply with it. This
method for judicial review of Board orders has been in place since Congress
enacted the National Labor Relations Act in its original form in 1935.13
Nonacquiescence, as the term is used in this Article, occurs when the Board
refuses to conform its rulings to the law of a reviewing circuit. The Board acknowledges that circuit court decisions are controlling for purposes of the individual cases in which they are issued but gives them no broader effect. It regards
the decisions simply as "the law of the case." 14 When the same issue arises in

future cases, the Board decides those cases in adherence to its previous view of
the statute, even if that view has been rejected by a circuit court likely to review
the case.1 5 Nonacquiescence continues when the Board refuses to fold up its
tent after its ruling is brought before a circuit that previously has rejected the
Board's view. At this level, the Board insists during the review proceeding upon
its right to "respectfully disagree" with the prior circuit decision.1 6 This nonac11. See infra notes 224-78 and accompanying text.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1982).
13. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1982)).
14. See, ag., Carpenters, Local 720, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1166, 1167 (NLRB 1987). The
Board's practice, accordingly, is to apply the law of the case in any remand of the decision but not to
consider the precedent binding in any other case. But see Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,
supra note 8, at 706 n.148 (acknowledging that the Board "typically" treats circuit decisions as the
law of the case but unearthing a few cases in which the Board did not accord even that respect to
circuit law).
15. See, eg., Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 975
(1980). Because the case arose in the Second Circuit and because the Second Circuit previously had
rejected the approach the Board applied in Ithaca College, a strong likelihood of review in the Second Circuit was apparent at the time of the Board's decision. Kafker, supra note 5, at 141. The
Board, however, could not have been certain where review would occur. See infra notes 53-59, 14247 and accompanying texts.
16. In each case cited below, the Board stood by its decision after the case had been brought
before a circuit with adverse precedent. See NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119, 127-28 (3d
Cir. 1984); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Enerhaul,
Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Blackstone Co., Inc., 685 F.2d 102, 106
n.5 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated, 462 U.S. 1127 (1983); PPG Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 822-23
(4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1980); Ithaca College
v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Mary Thompson Hosp.,
Inc. v. NLR.B, 621 F.2d 858, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965,
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quiescence, both at the agency level and during judicial review, is referred to
17
herein as "intracircuit nonacquiescence."
Nonacquiescence, moreover, arises from disputed questions of law or mixed

questions of law and fact. When a circuit court disagrees with the Board's factual determinations in a particular case and refuses to enforce the Board's order,
that decision provokes no opportunity for nonacquiescence. There has been no
fundamental disagreement between the Board and court on the meaning of the
statute or on how the statute's underlying policies are best effectuated. Opportunity for nonacquiescence arises only when the reviewing court and the Board
disagree on the statute's meaning or, more commonly, on the policies the Board
has adopted in implementing the Act. 18 Intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs
when the Board then adheres to its view in cases reviewed by (or arising in) a
circuit that previously rejected the Board's position.
Intracircuit nonacquiescence must be distinguished from intercircuit nonac-

quiescence, which occurs when one circuit has rejected the Board's view and the
Board subsequently presses its view before another circuit. 19 Intercircuit nonac968 (3d Cir. 1979); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1978). This posture is
viewed as nonacquiescence at the appeals level by the circuit courts.
Former General Counsel Rosemary Collyer has stated the Board often will submit to entry of
judgment against it in a circuit with adverse precedent. See Remarks of Rosemary M. Collyer before
Southwestern Legal Foundation, October 18, 1983, reprintedin DAILY LAB. REP.No. 206, October
24, 1985, at E-l, and discussed in Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 708. [hereinafter Remarks of Rosemary M. Collyer] Collyer's remarks are inconsistent with the Board's actions in reported cases and with its subsequently articulated position in Arvin Automotive, 285
N.L.R.B. 753, 757 (1987). For a discussion of Arvin Automotive, see infra notes 48-68 and accompa-

nying text.

Additionally, in McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 518, 518 (5th Cir. 1974), the
case Collyer cited in support of her proposition, the Board petitioned for enforcement in a circuit
with adverse precedent and, though acknowledging that circuit law would control disposition of the
case, formally adhered to its position in the face of circuit law. The case does not reflect a consent to
entry of judgment.
17. 'Courts criticizing the Board for nonacquiescence have expected the Board to conform its
position to circuit rulings even when the case did not arise within the circuit. See, eg., Yellow Taxi
Co., 721 F.2d at 382 (case arose in Minnesota but review was sought in the D.C. circuit). In essence,
the courts seem to contend that once the Board is before the appeals court, it knows that court's law
will apply, and it should withdraw its enforcement petition in the face of adverse precedent. See
Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence, supranote 8, at 605. For a discussion of the differences between
nonacquiescence at the agency level and nonacquiescence at the appellate review level, see infra
notes 137, 173-202 and accompanying texts.
18. Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 599 (recognizing that fact-oriented reversals do not create a situation in which nonacquiescence is possible). "A court creates precedent in
which agency nonacquiescence is possible 'when it sets forth a statutory interpretation contrary to
that of the agency.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP.No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 23 (1984)).
Professor Maranville distinguishes between what she refers to as "formal" and "informal" nonacquiescence. Maranville, supra note 8, at 480-84. In situations of informal nonacquiescence, the
Board either fails to acknowledge the existence of circuit precedents, or tries, unconvincingly, to
make factual distinctions between the precedent and the case at hand. Id. at 480. These cases, too,
involve differing views of the law, not simply differences in the application of agreed-upon law to
disagreed-upon facts. But informal nonacquiescence, Maranville points out, engenders less hostility
in the judiciary. Id. at 483. Formal nonacquiescence, in which the Board freely admits to its "respectful disagreements" with circuit law, "simply may be perceived as too blatant a threat to judicial
status." Id. at 484.
19. For a discussion of the differences between intercircuit and intracircuit nonacquiescence,
see Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 687-88; Maranville, supra note 8, at 48486; Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 583.
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quiescence invokes no judicial hostility, in part because it mirrors the way circuit

courts themselves treat precedent from other circuits. 20 Although one circuit
may find another's views persuasive, no circuit considers itself bound by decisions of a sister circuit. 2 1 In contrast, decisions by one panel within a circuit are
regarded as the "law of the circuit" and binding on subsequent panels and dis-

trict courts within the circuit. 22 It thus is not surprising that intercircuit nonacquiescence is understood and tacitly approved by reviewing courts, while

intracircuit nonacquiescence is routinely condemned.
The Board long has adhered to its policy of nonacquiescence. 23 Since at

least 1944, the Board has insisted upon its right to disagree with the circuit

courts over the statute's meaning. 24 Under the Board's view, only Supreme
Court decisions bind the Board in future cases. 25 For years, the Board has ex-

pressly instructed its administrative law judges to follow the law as declared by
the Board, rather than the law as declared by the various circuit courts. 26 The
Board itself will "determine whether to acquiesce in the contrary views of a
circuit court of appeals or whether, with due deference to the court's opinion, to

adhere to its previous holding until the Supreme Court of the United States has
ruled otherwise." 27

The Board's position is premised, in part, on its responsibility for administering a national statute.28 The National Labor Relations Act, according to the
20. Maranville, supra note 8, at 485; see also Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supranote
8, at 740 (discussing judicial acceptance of intercircuit nonacquiescence); Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 583 (same).
21. See Generali v. D'Amico, 766 F.2d 485, 489 (1lth Cir. 1985); Friendly, The "Law of the
Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 413 (1972); Maranville, supra note 8, at 485;
Vestal, RelitigationBy FederalAgencies Conflict, Concurrenceand Synthesis of JudicialPolicies, 55
N.C.L. REv.123, 162-63 & n.246 (1976). For a discussion of the circuits' failure to follow intercircuit stare decisis, see infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
23. For discussion of the history of the Board's nonacquiescence policy, see Estreicher &
Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 706-12.
24. Acme Indus. Police, 58 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1345 (1944); Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 706 & n.144.
25. The Board does acknowledge the binding force of Supreme Court precedent. See Acme
Indus.Police, 58 N.L.R.B. at 1344 n.3; Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957).
Once the Supreme Court decides a question, the Board thereafter conforms its conduct to the
Court's decision. Id.
26. InsuranceAgents, 119 N.L.R.B. at 773. In this case, the administrative law judge (ALU)
had applied the law as declared by the D.C. Circuit, not the law declared by the Board. The Board
took issue with the AUJ's conduct, instructing its ALIs to apply Board, not circuit court, precedent
in deciding the cases before them. Id. at 772-73.
The ALIs have abided by the Board's directive, but not without incurring the wrath of the
reviewing courts. See, eg., Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1263 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. InsuranceAgents, 119 N.L.R.B. at 773. In fact, the Board frequently does decide to acquiesce to the views of a circuit court. Zimmerman, Restoring Stability in the Implementation of the
NationalLaborRelations Act, 1 LAB. LAw. 1, 5-6 (1985). See Remarks of Rosemary Collyer, supra
note 16, for a discussion of recent cases in which the Board has rejected its prior decisions in favor of
circuit court precedents. The point is that the Board insists on reserving for itself the right to evaluate the circuit courts' reasoning and to decide whether to adopt it as the new or revised policy of the
Board.
28. Modjeska, supra note 8, at 407 & n.51; Zimmerman & Dunn, Relations Between the NLRB
and the Courts ofAppeals: A Tale ofAcrimony and Accommodation, 8 EMP. REL. L.J. 4, 5 (1982);
Zimmerman, supra note 27, at 3. For criticisms of the Board's position, see Ferguson & Bordoni,
supra note 8, at 216-17; Kafker, supra nqte 5, at 142-43; infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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Board, must be applied uniformly throughout the country. 29 Applying the law
of the circuit would lead to geographical differences in the Act's meaning and
application. 30 Nonacquiescence preserves uniformity, at least at the Board
31
level.
The circuit courts have never been enamored with nonacquiescence. Over
the years, circuits have refused enforcement of Board orders inconsistent with
circuit law. 32 It was not until the Third Circuit's decision in Allegheny General
Hospitalv. NLRB, 33 however, that judicial war was declared.
At issue in Allegheny was whether separate bargaining units for maintenance and powerhouse employees were appropriate in a hospital. 34 The Third
Circuit previously had ruled such units were inappropriate in the health care
35
industry, rejecting the Board's position that separate units were appropriate.
On remand the Board in Allegheny expressed its "respectful disagreement" with
36
the circuit's view.
The Third Circuit railed at the Board for disregarding the law of the circuit,
which the court considered binding on the Board. 37 The court noted the Board
29. InsuranceAgents, 119 N.LR.B. at 773 ("Only by [exercising a power to nonacquiesce] will
a uniform and orderly administration of a national act, such as the National Labor Relations Act, be
achieved.").
30. Were the Board, for example, to follow the law of the circuit in which an unfair labor
practice arose, it would be applying the law differently in different parts of the country. For a
critique of this result, see infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
31. *By nonacquiescing, the Board maintains uniformity at the agency level, but when appellate
courts then apply circuit law on review, national uniformity is lost. Thus, a nonacquiescence policy,
by itself, cannot achieve uniformity.
Some critics have used the lack of uniformity after review as a basis for condemning nonacquiescence, arguing that if uniformity is not achieved in the long run, then nonacquiescence cannot be
justified. See Ferguson & Bordoni, supra note 8, at 216; Kafker, supra note 5, at 142-43. However,
Board-level uniformity is itself a justifiable goal, enabling the Board to administer the statute more
efficiently. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 748; infra notes 163-65 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the lack of uniformity that results from reviewing courts applying
circuit law could be mitigated if the courts adopted the proposal advocated in this Article that they
relax their reliance on circuit law in cases of Board nonacquiescence. See infra notes 245-53 and
accompanying text.
32. See, eg., Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 909 (1953); Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 710-12.
33. 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
34. Id at 966.
35. St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977); Memorial Hosp. of
Roxborough v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351, 356-59 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit's view was based on
the court's reading of the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the NLRA, which brought
hospitals and other health care institutions within the Act's coverage. See St. Vincent's Hosp., 567
F.2d at 589-92.
36. After carefully reconsidering the legislative history of the 1974 amendments, we have
concluded, that, with all due respect to the court, Congress did not intend to prohibit such
units.... Also in its decision in St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB, the court went on to
conclude that the legislative history of the 1974 amendments also precluded the Board
from relying on its traditional community-of-interest criteria in making unit determinations in the health care industry. On this point, too, we must respectfully disagree.
Allegheny, 608 F.2d at 967 (quoting 239 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (1978)).
37. Id. at 969-70. In their article, Professors Estriecher and Revesz regard Allegheny as involving the Board's refusal to follow "the law of the case," not simply the law of the circuit. Estreicher
& Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 707 n.148. The case previously had been remanded to
the Board on its own motion for reconsideration in light of the St. Vincent decision. Allegheny, 608
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was not an "equal" to the court but rather was a subordinate on questions of

statutory interpretation, relying on Marbury v. Madison's pronouncement that
"[ilt is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."' 38 Accordingly, the Third Circuit said, the Board lacked "au39
thority to disagree, respectfully or otherwise," with circuit court decisions.
The circuit courts have seized on Allegheny's reasoning, treating Board

nonacquiescence as defiance of judicial authority. 4° For example, the Eleventh
Circuit awarded attorneys' fees against the Board for issuing a complaint at odds
with circuit law.4 1 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recently threatened to impose
42
sanctions against the Board if nonacquiescence continues.

Why has nonacquiescence, openly practiced by the Board for almost fifty
years, become such a lightning rod for judicial hostility only in the last ten
years? Perhaps the Board has been tarred by the practices of other agencies that
engage in nonacquiescence, most notably the Social Security Administration

("SSA"). 43 In the early 1980s, the SSA began aggressively pursuing a policy of
F.2d at 966. On remand, the Board considered the reasoning used in St. Vincent and declined to
adopt it. Id. The case was then refiled before the Third Circuit. Id. at 967.
There was, however, no law of the case regarding unit appropriateness. Rather, the law the
reviewing court criticized the Board for failing to apply was the law as developed in Memorial Hospital and St. Vincent. Nor, apparently, had the Third Circuit commanded the Board in remanding the
original Allegheny petition to apply that law. Thus, Allegheny more properly is regarded, as the
court itself regarded it, as a failure by the Board to apply the law of the circuit, not the law of the
case. It was clear in Allegheny, however, that the Third Circuit was the court likely to hear the case,
since the case was before the Board on remand from the Third Circuit.
Even when remanded, however, a case ultimately may not be reviewed in the same circuit that
issued the remand. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 898 F.2d 524, 528-29 (1990) (remanded to Board by D.C. Circuit and then reviewed in Seventh Circuit); Estreicher & Revesz,
Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 687 n.34.
38. Allegheny, 608 F.2d at 970 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
39. Id.
40. Many of these courts, in condemning nonacquiescence, quoted Allegheny or expressly relied
on its reasoning. See, eg., NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Mgt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987);
NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 1984); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v.
NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 823 n.9

(4th Cir. 1982); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975
(1980). Board Chairman Dotson aptly described Allegheny as "representative of the circuit decisions." Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. 753, 761 (1987) (Dotson, dissenting). Certainly, it is fair
to say that the reasoning used to criticize nonacquiescence by the Board has not proceeded beyond
that employed in Allegheny.
41. Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 1983). The court did not consider
the fact that the General Counsel, at the time the complaint was issued, could not have known with
certainty that the case would be reviewed in the Eleventh Circuit. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
apparently believes circuit law binds not only the Board, but also the General Counsel. As Professor
Maranville points out, this belief is quite an expansion of the controlling case doctrine. See Maranville, supra note 8, at 507-08. For a discussion of the application of the controlling case doctrine to
agency nonacquiescence, see infra notes 153, 182-83 and accompanying texts.
42. Ashkenazy Prop.Mgt. Corp., 817 F.2d at 75 ('[A]ny future act of 'nonacquiescence' should
be dealt with by this court in the specific context in which it occurs so that we may address the
agency's particular violation of the rule of law and fashion a remedy that is appropriate in light of all
the relevant circumstances."). This threat has not gone unnoticed by the Board. See Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at 761 (Dotson, dissenting).
43. See Revenge of the Judges; Conference Can't Resolve Agency-Court Clash, Legal Times,
September 26, 1988, at 2. The nonacquiescence debate, "both in the [Administrative] conference
and in the extensive writing on the subject, has clearly been colored by the practices of the Social
Security Administration." Id. at 3. At the September 10, 1988, meeting of the Administrative Con-
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nonacquiescence, cutting off benefits to disabled individuals in the face of contrary circuit law.44 Class action suits were filed,45 and some courts enjoined the
SSA's actions. 46 As a result, nonacquiescence by all administrative agencies was
in the spotlight, and it was roundly criticized by academics as well as by the
judiciary. 47
48
In 1987, the Board responded to these attacks. The Arvin Automotive

Board refused to apply the law as declared by the Eleventh Circuit, the circuit in
which the case arose. 49 In doing so, the Board deemed "it advisable to explain
in some detail [its] reasons for declining to embrace" circuit law. 50 Those reaference rejecting guidelines for curbing nonacquiescence, its panel leader stated that "[p]art of the
problem that keeps people from approaching this problem objectively is the horrible record of the
Social Security Administration and [Health and Human Services Department] under this administration particularly.... People don't want to talk compromise because there is tremendous polarization." Id. For a similar view, see Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 681;
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1817.
Another agency that routinely has engaged in nonacquiescence is the Internal Revenue Service.
Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 713-14. Professors Estreicher and Revesz,
moreover, conducted a survey of the major federal administrative agencies and concluded almost all
engage in nonacquiescence, at least on an ad hoc basis. Two exceptions were the Federal Communications Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at 716-18. However, the most
"notorious" practitioners of nonacquiescence have been the SSA, the IRS, and the NLRB. See, eg.,
id. at 681-82; Maranville, supra note 8, at 477-78; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1816-17; Note, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 584.
44. The SSA had followed a policy of nonacquiescence for years, but under 1980 amendments
to the Act, it was required to begin checking, from time to time, a claimant's continuing eligibility
for benefits. These reassessments provoked disputes over whether evidence of medical improvements
to the claimant's condition was needed to justify cutting off benefits. The agency contended no such
evidence need be presented; numerous reviewing courts disagreed. The SSA refused to acquiesce to
the circuits' view.
For detailed discussion of the SSA's nonacquiescence practices, see Coenen, supra note 8; Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 692-704; Kubitschek, supra note 8, at 401-08;
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1817-18 n.3; Note, Nonacquiescence: Health and Human Services' Refusal to Follow FederalCourt Precedent, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 737, 744-47 (1985).
45. See, ig,,Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 376 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820
(1987); Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1986); Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 815
(3d Cir. 1983), vacated, 469 U.S. 977 (1984); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1321
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492, 493
(M.D. Ala. 1984); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 466 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Lopez v. Heckler,
572 F. Supp. 26, 27 (C.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated, 469 U.S. 1082
(1984).
46. See, eg., Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 1987); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F.
Supp. 463, 496 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492, 495-97 (M.D. Ala. 1984);
Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D.C. Cal. 1983), rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.),
vacated, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
47. See cases cited supra notes 1, 45; critical commentary cited supra note 8.
In 1984, while considering the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Congress
considered a proposal to bar intracircuit nonacquiescence. H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302
(1984). It refused to enact that provision, however, although House and Senate conferees did express concern over agency nonacquiescence. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37,
reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3095.
48. 285 N.L.R.B. 753 (1987).
49. Id. at 754. The issue inArin concerned when the statute of limitations period begins to run
in regard to the enforcement or maintenance of a superseniority clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. The Eleventh Circuit in a previous case had held that the statute begins running at the
time the contract is executed. The Board refused to adopt this automatic rule, preferring instead to
determine the matter on a case-by-case basis. Id.
50. Id. at 756. In the 30 years between its decision in Insurance Agents International Union,
119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), and its decision in Arvin Automotive, the Board offered no detailed justifi-
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sons focused primarily on the venue provisions of the National Labor Relations
51
Act.
By focusing on the Act's venue provisions, the Board sought to distinguish
itself from other agencies, particularly the SSA. 52 The venue provisions for review of Board orders5 3 are broader than those governing many other administrative agencies.5 4 The NLRA's broad venue scheme contrasts with the venue
provisions applicable to the SSA, which provide that venue always lies in the
5
circuit in which the disabled individual resides. 5
Under the venue provisions of the NLRA, the Board may seek enforcement

of its order in the circuit where the unfair labor practice arose or in which the
respondent resides or transacts business. 56 As a general policy, the Board seeks
enforcement in the circuit in which the case arose.5 7 This policy, however, does
not make venue certain. 58 Instead of waiting for the Board to file an enforcecation for its nonacquiescence policy. By 1987, however, when Arvin was decided, judicial hostility
toward Board nonacquiescence was in full bloom. Moreover, Board Chairman Dotson was urging
the Board to abandon its nonacquiescence policy. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. It
thus was incumbent upon the Board to lay out the reasons for refusing to follow circuit law.
51. Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at 757. The Board also noted that, since the Eleventh
Circuit's prior decision, three other circuits had disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's position. /d.
at 756-57. The Board found it possible that the Eleventh Circuit would reexamine its position and
would fall into line with the other circuits. Id. at 757.
52. Commentators before and after Arvin have recognized that venue uncertainty is a basis for
distinguishing nonacquiescence by the NLRB from nonacquiescence by agencies operating under
venue-certain statutes. They have disagreed, however, on whether this factor legitimates Board nonacquiescence. Compare, eg., Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 741-43 (finding
Board nonacquiescence lawful and recognizing the broad venue provisions of the NLRA); Modjeska,
supra note 8, at 416-17 & n.1l0 (same); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1856-57 & n.159 (same); with
Dotson & Williamson, supra note 8, at 746 & n.36 (contending that venue choice does not excuse
Board nonacquiescence); Ferguson & Bordoni, supranote 8, at 207 (same); Silver & McAvoy, supra
note 8, at 199-205 (same). For further discussion of venue uncertainty and its effect on the lawfulness of Board nonacquiescence, see infra notes 145-71 and accompanying text.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1988).
54. "[T~he NLRB has by far the most liberal venue provisions (and, consequently, the greatest
opportunity for forum-shopping) for judicial review of its final orders." Comment, "RespectfulDisagreement": Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrative Agencies in United States Courts of Appeals
Precedents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 463, 491 (1985). In particular, the venue provisions
governing the NLRB are broader than those governing the Social Security Administration, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988), and the Internal Revenue Service, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1988), the two other
administrative agencies whose nonacquiescence policies have provoked judicial and academic criticism. See supranote 43. See also Kafker, supra note 5, at 144 (venue uncertainty has been a primary
ground for distinguishing nonacquiescence by the NLRB from nonacquiescence by the SSA and
IRS).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). In addition, an appeal of an SSA decision denying benefits is to
the district court, with a right of appeal to the court of appeals. Id. In contrast, a petition to enforce
or to set aside an order of the NLRB is filed directly with the court of appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-

(f) (1988).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988).
57. Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. 753, 754 n.2 (1987). Moreover, once a petition for review
is filed, the Board will file its cross-petition for enforcement in the circuit in which the review petition is filed. This policy, as noted by Professors Estreicher and Revesz, prevents the Board from
taking "full advantage of the strategic benefits of venue choice." Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 766. Presumably the Board has chosen to sacrifice a litigation advantage not
only for the ease of application, but to avoid the unseemly practice of forum shopping.
58. "Although it is the Board's policy to seek enforcement of its orders in the circuit in which
the unfair labor practice arose, that policy in no way assures that the Board's decision in any given
case will actually be reviewed in that circuit." Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at 754 n.2; see also
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ment action, the aggrieved party (employer or union) can seek review of a Board
order either 1) in the circuit in which the case arose, or 2) in any circuit in which

it resides or transacts business, or 3) in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.5 9 As the Board noted in Arvin Automotive, this venue
provision always makes multiple circuits available for review of Board orders
and all circuits available to a union or employer that transacts business nationwide. 6° In Arvin Automotive, for example, the Board had no way of knowing

whether the case in fact would be reviewed in the Eleventh Circuit. 6 1 These
broad venue provisions, the Board said, evidence a congressional intent in favor

of nonacquiescence. 62 As the Board stated, "it is thus apparent that we operate
that the law of a single circuit
under a statute that simply does not contemplate
63
would exclusively apply in any given case."

Board Chairman Dotson dissented, saying he would abandon the Board's
nonacquiescence policy in favor of applying the law of the circuit in which the

case arose. 64 He noted circuit court opposition to nonacquiescence, 6 5 the futility
of the Board's pressing a position at odds with circuit precedent, 66 and the spec-

ter of remedial action against the Board if it continues its nonaequiescence policy. 67 Dotson, echoing the position of the circuit courts, called nonacquiescence

"legally untenable" and in conflict with "fundamental tenets of our Federal
' 68
system."
The fundamental tenet uppermost in Dotsdn's and the judiciary's mind was
and continues to be Marbury v. Madison's pronouncement, relied upon in Allegheny, that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 712, 742 (discussing the Board's inability to
predict venue).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988).
60. 285 N.L.R.B. at 757.
61. Id. Although the case arose in the Eleventh Circuit and the Board would file a petition for
enforcement there, the aggrieved party could seek review in another circuit.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Dotson would require not only the Board but also its General Counsel and, presumably, its
ALJs to apply the law of the circuit in which the case arose. Id. at 758-63 (Dotson, dissenting).
Dotson's approach, while it could not eliminate venue uncertainty, would enable the Board to identify which circuit's law to apply. For criticism of this approach, see infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
65. Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at 760-61 (Dotson, dissenting).
66. Id. at 762 (Dotson, dissenting). "Experience confirms that which is implicit in this grant of
authority [to enforce, modify, or set aside Board orders]: a Board decision will be enforced only
when it accords with circuit precedent." Id. (Dotson, dissenting). In other words, Dotson recognized that even if nonacquiescence were lawful, it accomplishes little, given the courts' reliance on
the law of the circuit. This reliance, however, is criticized infra at notes 224-68 and accompanying
text.
Dotson agreed with the Board's position on the merits, as opposed to the view of the Eleventh
Circuit, regarding when the statute of limitations begins to run. Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at
762 (Dotson, dissenting). Yet, for the reasons set forth in the text, he argued that the Board should
abide by the law as declared by the circuit court. Id. at 759-63 (Dotson, dissenting).
67. Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at 761 (Dotson, dissenting). Dotson found such remedial
action to be "foreshadowed" by the Ninth Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Mgt.
Corp., 817 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at 762 (Dotson, dissenting). Dotson expressed similar
views in a contemporaneous law review article. Dotson & Williamson, supra note 8, at 746-47.
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to say what the law is." 69 But citation to Marbury, as explained more fully
below, does nothing to resolve the legality of nonacquiescence to circuit court
decisions. 70 Marbury establishes only that a court's decision is binding as the
law of the case. 7 1 Marbury does not oblige any litigant, including the executive
72
branch, to act in accordance with a circuit court's decision in the future.
Nonetheless, the judiciary's reliance on Marbury is telling. It reflects a reluctance to recognize what the Supreme Court has made increasingly clear in
recent years: administrative agencies, as well as the federal courts, have a duty
73
and the authority to say what the law is.
It is inappropriate judicial secondguessing of Board lawmaking that often has set the stage for the Board's subsequent nonacquiescence. 74

II. THE PROPER SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
When judges, accustomed to deciding "what the law is," are expected to
defer to agency lawmaking and statutory interpretation, tension occurs. 75 While
deferral to agency fact-finding has been accepted, deferral to an agency's view of
the law, particularly when the agency's view differs from the reviewing court's,
76

has not.

69. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), quoted in Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v.

NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979); Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. at 760-61 (Dotson, dis-

senting). Marbury's pronouncement that judges "say what the law is" has been relied on heavily by

decisions and commentary criticizing nonacquiescence. See, e.g., Ferguson & Bordoni, supranote 8,
at 201-10, 214-15 ("In light of the principles established in Marbury and the statutory provisions for
direct judicial review, the NLRB is indeed bound to follow the law as established by the federal
circuit court of appeals."). For further discussion of separation of powers and Board nonacquiescence, see infra notes 154, 177-81 and accompanying texts.
70. Maranville, supra note 8, at 522; Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 595;
Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 161. For further discussion, see infra notes 154, 177-81 and
accompanying text.
71. Wechsler, The Courtsand the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1008 (1965) ("Under
Marbury, the Court decides a case; it does not pass a statute caling for obedience by all within the
purview of the rule that is declared."); see also Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 161 (discussion of Marbury'srelation to the issue of agency nonacquiescence); infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (arguing that Marbury is weak support for argument against nonacquiescence).
As Professor Modjeska points out, moreover, Board orders are not self-enforcing, and Marbury
thus is fully satisfied by the judiciary's ability to have the last word in declaring the law of the case.
Modjeska, supra note 8, at 417.
Supreme Court decisions, however, do have a broader reach and are binding nationwide, not
just on the parties to a dispute. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). For a discussion of Cooper
v. Aaron, see Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 723-25. But see Meese, The
Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987). The Board, however, acknowledges the controlling force of Supreme Court precedent. See supra note 25.
72. See sources cited supra note 71.
73. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
For discussion of this issue, see infra notes 75-136 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 5; infra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
75. See Scalia, JudicialDeference to AdministrativeInterpretationsof Law, 1989 DuxE L.J. 511,
513-14 (recognizing the judiciary's reluctance to accept an executive agency's judgment on a question of law). Such deference is viewed as "a striking abdication ofjudicial responsibility," at odds
with a "deep-rooted feeling that it is the judges who must say what the law is." Id. at 514; see also
Maranville, supra note 8, at 528 (discussing value conflict between judicial and agency lawmaking);
Strauss, supra note 5, at 1126-29 (discussing judicial resistance to agency-made law and the conflict
between judicial focus on individual rights and agency focus on overall program).
76. "The NLRB nonacquiescence cases often have appeared to involve statutory interpretation
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Administrative agencies do have lawmaking authority. 7 7 Some have more
than others, depending upon the specificity and clarity of the agency's enabling

statute. 78 The greater the ambiguity and breadth of the statute, the greater the
79
power Congress confers on the agency.
The National Labor Relations Act, because it is purposely broad and am-

biguous, confers considerable lawmaking power on the Board.80 That Congress
preferred agency, rather than judicial, lawmaking in the labor relations arena
reflects the circumstances under which the Act was passed.8 1 Congress enacted
the NLRA and created the Board in an atmosphere of distrust and displeasure
toward judge-made labor law. By 1935, judicial decisions particularly hostile to
unions had made Congress wary of giving federal judges authority to decide
questions of labor policy. 8 2 The Board was formed to take national labor policy
questions influenced by fundamental political disagreements between pro-union agency members and
management-oriented courts over the desirability of unionization efforts." Maranville, supra note 8,
at 491; see Kafker, supranote 5, at 151-52 (discussing the appeals courts' failure to defer to Board on
questions of law); Vance, A View From the Circuit: A FederalCircuitJudge Views the NLRA Appellate Scene, 1 LAB. LAW. 39, 45-46 (1985) (recognizing that most of the cases denying enforcement of
Board orders involve differing interpretations of the substantive law); Zimmerman & Dunn, supra
note 28, at 4-5 (discussing the courts' reluctance to honor agency interpretations).
77. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45; Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S. Ct. 960, 964 (1990).
As Professor Jaffe recognized years ago, "If we admit that the administrative as well as the
judiciary can, and within limits should, make law, our analytic problem is much simplified." L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 547 (1965).
Jaffe was not discussing nonacquiescence, but his observation is pertinent to this issue. Once
one accepts an agency's authority to make law, an agency's refusal to acquiesce in circuit law becomes more understandable. This is not to suggest that agency-lawmaking authority of itself validates nonacquiescence, but it does place the agency's reasons for nonacquiescence into a proper
perspective. Strauss, supra note 5, at 1114-15. As Professor Modjeska notes, a "[r]ealistic appraisal
of the appropriate scope of judicial review is essential to grasping the jurisprudential oversimplification and operational impracticability of intracircuit acquiescence theory." Modjeska, supra note 8,
at 410.
78. When a statute is detailed, clear, and specific, then Congress has spoken; no power to make
law has been delegated to the agency. But when a statute is silent or ambiguous, Congress has
delegated its lawmaking authority to the agency. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see infra notes 98-99
and accompanying text; see also Scalia, supra note 75, at 516-17 (Justice Scalia bases Chevron review
on congressional intent.). By enacting a silent or ambiguous statute, Congress has conferred on the
agency the discretion to resolve the issue at hand. The only question of law for the courts is whether
the agency acted within the scope of its discretion. Id.
79. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
80. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (i990) (quoting Beth
Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978)) (recognizing the need for Board "'authority
to ... fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions'" of the NLRA); Phelps Dodge Corp. v
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) ("A statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which
the National Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased and necessarily carries with it
the task of administrative application."); see also Modjeska, supra note 8, at 406 (pointing out that
"the Board, not the courts, was the vehicle devised by Congress to make oncrete the broadly
phrased policies of the Act"); Winter, JudicialReview ofAgency Decisions: The LaborBoard and the
Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 53, 57 (1968) (noting the ambiguity of the NLRA).
81. Modjeska, supranote 8, at 401-09; Winter, supranote 80, at 59. For discussion of the labor
unrest, judicial decisions, and other historical developments leading to the passage of the NLRA, see
A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE

LABOR INJUNCTION 134-98 (1930); C. GREGORY & H. KATz, LABOR AND THE LAW 52-252 (3d ed.
1979).
82. As Professor Modjeska notes, the NLRA was written "against a backdrop of judicial insensitivity, if not hostility to the principles of unionism and collective bargaining." Modjeska, supra
note 8, at 401. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988), which restricts federal
court injunctions in labor disputes, was passed in response to decisions particularly unsympathetic to
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out of the hands of courts unsympathetic to the concerns of organized labor.8 3
Yet Congress did confide to the circuit courts the role of reviewing Board

orders, with power to enforce them, to modify them, or to set them aside. 84 This
review process serves not only to keep the Board within its statutory limits but
to validate the agency's power as well.85 Congress did not design this process, as
the Supreme Court long has held, to permit judicial usurpation of the Board's
86

lawmaking authority.
In early cases arising under the Act, the Supreme Court acknowledged the

Board's preeminent role in fashioning federal labor policy, admonishing the
lower courts to defer to the Board's policy choices. 87 The Court has continued

labor. See, eg., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1908). Similarly, the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), "continued what the
Norris-LaGuardia Act had begun, and further removed the federal courts from labor relations."
Modjeska, supranote 8, at 404; see Winter, supranote 80, at 59 n.5 (viewing creation of the Board as
a result of congressional dissatisfaction with judge-made labor law).
83. Professor Modjeska states that in creating the Board, Congress was concerned about
achieving uniformity and expertise in administration of a federal labor relations law. Modjeska,
supra note 8, at 407-08. "Accordingly, to achieve its 'vital national purpose' Congress gave primary
authority for the interpretation, development, and effectuation of national labor policy to the Board,
rather than the courts." Id. at 408.
Additionally, Professor Ralph Winter points out that judges were ill-equipped to deal with the
subject of collective bargaining. Few had any experience with the issue, and any experience that did
exist was "of a kind that is likely to create a distended and skewed view of the institution." Winter,
supra note 80, at 57. Moreover, Winter adds, the NLRA is not modeled on the common law, and

courts therefore could not rely upon common-law analogies to resolve labor law problems, Id. at 57-

58. Thus, there was a particular need for an expert agency, "better able to understand the implications of the legal issues presented and to fashion rules that are realistic in terms of the underlying
problem." Id.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1988); Kafker, supra note 5, at 156.
85. As Professor Jaffe explains,
The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally
valid.... [Tihere is in our society a profound, tradition-taught reliance on the courts as
the ultimate guardian and assurance of the limits set upon executive power by the constitutions and the legislatures.
L. JAFFE, supra note 77, at 320-21.
86. For discussion of the Supreme Court's position on judicial review of Board orders, see
Modjeska, supra note 8, at 409-11.
87. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
Hearst is particularly instructive. At issue in Hearst was whether "newsboys" were employees
within the meaning of the Act. The Board held that they were, rejecting the companies' contention
that one who would be an independent contractor under common law was not an employee. 322
U.S. at 115. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's position, deferring to the Board's construction
of the statute. Id. at 130. As the Court stated:
where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding
in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing
court's function is limited. .. . mThe Board's determination that specified persons are
'employees' under this Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law.
Id. at 131. Thus, the Court's deferral to the Board on questions of statutory construction has a long
history.
Congress responded by amending the Act to exclude independent contractors from the Act's
coverage, criticizing the Court for relying on the Board's "theoretic expertness." H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18. Professor Archibald Cox views this exclusion as manifesting "an
intention not only to narrow the scope of the Board's jurisdiction and the reach of the Act but also to
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to demand such deference from the lower courts.88 Occasionally, however, the
Court has departed from this principle and has taken on the task of formulating
89
labor law.

Lower federal courts have been particularly reluctant to recognize their
limited role when reviewing NLRB decisions. 90 Perhaps this reluctance stems
from the deep-seated views many judges have about labor policy. 9 1 The more
likely reason for judicial resistance to Board lawmaking, however, is the manner

in which the Board accomplishes it. The Board is unique in using adjudication,
not formal rulemaking, to establish policy. 9 2 When policy is developed after a
trial-like proceeding and in the form of a written opinion, Board policymaking
curb the power of the Board in relation to that of the judiciary." A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN,
LABOR LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS 100 (10th ed. 1986).
If curbing the Board's power ever were Congress's intent, it has not been realized. Rather, the
Hearst approach to judicial review has been endorsed by Chevron. See Pierce, Chevron and Its
Aftermath: JudicialReview ofAgency Interpretationsof StatutoryProvisions,41 VAND. L. REv. 301,
311-12 (1988); Strauss, supra note 5, at 1119.
88. See, eg., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990); Fall
River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,42 (1987); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 417-19 (1982); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01
(1978).
89. "If any conclusion can be drawn, it is that the Supreme Court believes great deference
should be shown to the Board's expertise, but when the Supreme Court itself is confident that the
Board is wrong, the Supreme Court need not practice what it preaches." Kafker, supra note 5, at
157. Professor Winter also has criticized the Court for too often appropriating the Board's policymaking function, even arguing that "the Court's failure to observe the proper scope of review of
Board decisions may raise a serious issue of separation of powers." Winter, supra note 80, at 74.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's failure to observe the proper limits ofjudicial review does not
pose the hazards for uniformity that are caused by similar failures of the courts of appeals. Even
when the high court errs, the Board acknowledges the Court's decision is binding. Thus, the Court's
interpretation prevails nationwide. But when a lower court does not observe the proper limits of
judicial review, that ruling engenders disagreement not only between the Board and the court, but
also among the various courts of appeals. Kafker, supra note 5, at 157-58.

90. Estreicher, The Second Circuit and the N.LR.B. 1980-81: A Case Study in JudicialReview
of Agency Action, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1063, 1071, 1090 (1982); Kafker, supra note 5, at 146-52;
see infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
91. See Currie & Goodman, JudicialReview of FederalAdministrative Action: Quest for the
Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1975), in which the authors advocate retaining
review of NLRB decisions in a three-member appellate panel, rather than in the district courts,
because "labor relations is an area in which variations in particular attitude and philosophy among
district judges are peculiarly likely to influence litigation outcomes." Id.; see also Maranville, supra
note 8, at 491 (noting the strong "political disagreements" between the Board and the reviewing
courts and asserting that these disagreements fuel the nonacquiescence debate); Vance, supra note
76, at 40 (in which the late Judge Vance noted that labor law "is a field in which strong convictions
hold sway" and may prompt what he believes to be a small minority ofjudges to "write opinions that
serve as vehicles for such convictions").
It has been asserted that circuit courts, with good reason, are becoming more willing to substitute their judgment for the Board's, based on a perception that Board members lack personal experience in collective bargaining and thus have no special expertise. See Ogden, An Impasse in
Decisionmaking, 31 LAB. L.L 559, 560 (1980). This argument overlooks the fact that Board expertise is not limited to Board members but includes the underlying staff as well. "That 'cumulative
experience' which in the Court's view comprises much of the Board's 'specialized knowledge' necessarily resides in substantial part with the career staff." Modjeska, supra note 8, at 427.
92. "Despite the fact that the NLRB has explicit rulemaking authority, ... it has chosenunlike any other major agency of the federal government-to make almost all its policy through
adjudication." NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., 110 S.Ct. 1542, 1566 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982)). The Board has been roundly criticized for its failure to
use rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication. See, eg., Morris, The N.LR.B. ht the Dog House Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 9 (1987).
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looks quite "judicial."'93 Appellate courts perhaps feel more competent to overturn such "judicially made" agency policies, substituting their own policies in
the process.
But agency lawmaking, whether through adjudication or through formal
rulemaking, is entitled to deference from the courts. 94 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC, the Supreme Court mandated deference to a wide range of agency
95
lawmaking.
Chevron established a two-step approach to judicial review. 96 First, the reviewing court must determine whether the statute speaks directly to the specific
issue at hand. 97 If the statute directly addresses the issue, then the court must
give effect to the clear and unambiguous congressional intent. 98 If, however, the
statute either skirts the precise issue or is ambiguous, the court must accept the
agency's view, provided that view is based on a permissible construction of the
99

statute.

Sometimes, the statute will direct the agency to fill in the statutory gaps,
expressly delegating legislative authority. If, as is often the case, the statute is
silent or ambiguous, however, Chevron recognizes that statutory silence or ambiguity is an implicit delegation of authority. 10° Thus, the agency's construction
93. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 148-49 (1985) (likening the NLRB to a labor

court).
94. Scalia, supra note 75, at 519. But see Comment, Deference to N.LR.B. Adjudicatory Decision Making: Has JudicialReview Become Meaningless?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 653, 685-87 (1989)
(suggesting Chevron may not apply to adjudicatory proceedings); cf.Union of Concerned Scientists
v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (asserting Chevron
applies only to adjudicatory proceedings).
95. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
96. For a discussion and debate of the Chevron "two-step" approach, see Starr, Sunstein, Willard & Morrison, JudicialReview ofAdministrativeAction in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
353 (1987). For another excellent discussion of Chevron, see Pierce, supra note 87.
97. When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
98. Id.
99. [If] the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be

necessary in the absence of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 843.

100. Id.; see Scalia, supra note 75, at 516.
In an article preceding Chevron, Professor Monaghan recognized that judicial deference to
agency interpretation of the law is simply a recognition of legislative delegation to the agency.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). So long as the
court determines that the agency is acting within its statutory boundaries, agency action should be
upheld. Id. at 32-34. As Monaghan stated:
In such an empowering arrangement, responsibility for meaning is shared between court
and agency; the judicial role is to specify what the statute cannot mean, and some of what
it must mean, but not all that it does mean. In this context, the court is not abdicating its
constitutional duty to "say what the law is" by deferring to agency interpretations of the
law: it is simply applying the law as "made" by the authorized law-making entity. Indeed,
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of an ambiguous statute must be upheld, whether or not it is the only or even the
best construction, as long as it is reasonable.10 1
In xeaching this result, the Chevron Court relied upon the political accountability of administrative agencies.1 0 2 The Court recognized that addressing statutory silences or ambiguities involves policy choices. Congress may have left
the issue unresolved for several reasons: Congress may have wanted the expert
agency to resolve it; Congress may not have been able to achieve a coalition on
the issue and thus passed the buck to the agency; or Congress may never have
considered the issue at all.1 0 3 None of these reasons has bearing on judicial

review; under any of these scenarios, the agency must make the policy choice. 10 4
Chevron thus recognizes that agencies, as politically accountable experts,
are better equipped than courts to make policy choices.' 0 5 Some commentators
have maintained that Chevron adopted the model of judicial review applied in
NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc.: an agency's statutory interpretation must be
aflirmed if it has a reasonable basis in the law. 106 As Professor Pierce asserts,
"the principal effect of the Chevron two-step is to allocate policy making respon10 7
sibility from judges to agencies-an effect with significant benefits."
Chevron applies to pure questions of statutory construction. 0 8 In NLRB v.
Food & Commercial Workers, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the
Board's determination that section 10(f) of the NLRA does not entitle a party to
judicial review of the General Counsel's informal settlements prior to hearing.10 9 Relying on Chevron, the Court held that the Board's construction was
it would be violating legislative supremacy by failing to defer to the interpretation of an
agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated law-making authority.
Id. at 27-28 (1983).
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11.
102. Id. at 865.
103. Id.; see Pierce, supra note 87, at 305.
104. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; see Pierce, supra note 87, at 307.
105. Professor Pierce has noted that an "agency is a more appropriate institution than a court to
resolve [policy issues]. Because agencies are more accountable to the electorate than courts, agencies
should have the dominant role in policymaking when the choice is between agencies and courts."
Pierce, supra note 87, at 307-08.
106. Id. at 311; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1119. Prior to Chevron, Professor Monaghan had
praised Hearst as a "paradigmatic illustration" of judicial review functioning as it should.
Monaghan, supra note 100, at 27. Chevron, in essence, confirms the Hearst approach.
107. Pierce, supra note 87, at 310.
108. See Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S. Ct. 960, 965-66 (1990). A question of pure statutory construction arises when the agency is construing the words of a statute susceptible to more than one
meaning, not simply making a policy choice left open by a statute. Id. But see Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Some lower courts read CardozaFonseca as not requiring deference to a pure question of statutory construction, even if the court
views the statute as ambiguous. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. United States Nuclear Reg.
Comm'n, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court divided on this issue in NLRB v.
United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112 (1987). See Scalia, supranote 75, at 512. Subsequently, however, the Sullivan Court, in a 5-4 decision, applied Chevron in a case of statutory construction, upholding HHS's construction of its enabling Act. Sullivan, 110 S. Ct. at 964-68. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens claimed an ambiguous statute could not "reasonably be ascribed
to a conscious delegation... [or] to the absence of intent." Id. at 973 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The opinion rejected this view as inconsistent with Chevron. Id. at 973 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. 484 U.S. 112, 130 (1987).
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permissible and thus entitled to deference.' 10 Under Chevron, as subsequently
interpreted and applied by the Court, whenever more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute exists, the court must defer to any permissible construction
by the agency. 111
While Food & Commercial Workers was a statutory construction case, more
often the courts, in reviewing Board orders, confront cases involving Board gapfilling under the broadly worded NLRA. Chevron forcefully reaffirmed that

such choices should be made by a politically accountable branch of
112

government.
In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,1 13 the Court most recently
confirmed this principle in strongly worded terms. At issue in Curtin Matheson
was the Board's refusal to adopt a presumption that striker replacements oppose
union representation. The employer contended that the Board's "no-presumption" rule was outside its discretion, claiming that replacement workers must be
presumed to oppose the union because replacements' interests are diametrically
opposed to those of the strikers.1 14 The Board found no such presumption warranted, reasoning that a replacement worker might support the union and noting
that, as a policy matter, an anti-union presumption would impair the right to
strike. 115 It instead adopted a "no-presumption" rule, leaving a determination
of replacement workers' union sentiments to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 116 The Supreme Court upheld the Board's rule because it was "not
1 17
irrational."
110. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that a pure question of statutory construction was at issue and that Chevron had been applied. 484 U.S. at 133-34 (Scalia, J.,concurring).
The full Court, however, did not necessarily join that view. Not until Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S.
Ct. 960 (1990), did a majority of the Court confirm Chevron's application to a pure question of
statutory construction.
111. Sullivan, 110 S.Ct. at 971 (1990).
112. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. The opinion stated:
[I]t is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government [the executive
branch] to make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests which Congress
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Id. The Court expressly stated that "federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do." Id. at 866.
113. 110 S.Ct. 1542 (1990).
114. Id. at 1550.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1551. A certified union enjoys a rebuttable presumption of majority status, Even
through work force turnover, it is presumed the employees continue to support the union in the same
proportion that existed at the time of certification. Bartenders Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 653 (1974).
During an economic strike, however, an employer may permanently replace striking employees.
The Board originally presumed these replacements did not support the union. Titan Metal Mfg. Co.,
135 N.L.R.B. 196, 215 (1962). Later, the Board reversed its position and began presuming replacements did support the union. Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507, 509 (1975). Thereafter, the

Board adopted its "no presumption" rule, refusing to adopt a presumption either way, and instead
opting to determine support, or lack thereof, on a case-by-case basis.
The Court in Curtin Matheson upheld this rule in the face of the employer's claim that the
Board's rejection of the anti-union presumption was unreasonable. The Court found that the employer's arguments "do not persuade us that the Board's position is irrational." Curtin Matheson,
110 S. Ct. at 1551.
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In reversing the Fifth Circuit, which had refused to enforce the Board's
order and instead had adopted a presumption of replacements' opposition to
union representation, the Court reminded the lower courts of the Board's pri-

mary role in the development and application of federal labor policy. 118 The
Court noted, moreover, that the Board's position was not less deserving of defer-

ence simply because it represented a departure from prior Board policy. 119 Finally, the powerful (and perhaps ultimately most persuasive) argument opposing
the Board's position and favoring a presumption of replacement opposition was

not cause for rejecting the Board's "not irrational" position. 120

118. The Curtin Matheson majority stated:
This Court has emphasized often that the NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing
and applying national labor policy:

Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of 'applying the Act's general
prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be
charged as violative of its terms,' that body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress

set for it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the
broad statutory provisions.
110 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (quoting Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945))) (other citations omitted).
119. Id. As Chevron recognized, an agency is entitled to change its mind and is free to rely on
the incumbent administration's policy views in changing its position. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. Its
policy choices are thus politically accountable. Also, flexibility is an attribute of the agency process;
the agency can continue to assess the wisdom of its position on an ongoing basis. Id. at 843, 865; see
also Scalia, supra note 75, at 518-19 (pointing out an agency's change in position should not be
"suspect"). Scalia noted that the agency is changing the law "in light of new information or even
new societal attitudes impressed upon it through the political process-all within the limited range
of discretion to 'change the law' conferred by the governing statute. Chevron, as I say, permits
recognition of this reality." Id.; see also Kafker, supra note 5, at 147-48 (recognizing that an
agency's change in position is not a proper basis for judicial disapproval); Strauss, supra note 5, at
1125-26 (same). But see Comment, supra note 94, at 685-87.
Congress presumably relied upon this flexibility in delegating broad policymaking power to the
Board. As Professor Winter has observed, labor legislation is difficult to amend. When the Board
reverses its policy decisions, it is handling ambiguous statutory language just as Congress intended.
Labor policy properly changes in response to changing political climates. Winter, supra note 80, at
65.

120. Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1550-53.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "the Board's 'no-presumption' rule seems to me to press to the limit the deference to which the Board is entitled in
assessing industrial reality," noting that the Board was "refusing to allow the employer to resort to
what would seem to be commonsense assumptions about the views of an entire class of workers."
Id. at 1554-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). This "commonsense assumption" is based on the reality that a union frequently will negotiate a strike settlement that calls for the firing of replacements
to make way for returning strikers. Id. at 1555 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Nonetheless, the
Court upheld the Board's "not irrational" refusal to adopt an anti-union presumption. Id. at 1553.
Justice Blackmun dissented, criticizing the Board for failing to reconcile its "no-presumption"
rule with a competing line of cases regarding the union's diminished bargaining rights and responsibilities for replacement workers. Id. at 1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his view, judicial review
permits the courts to insist that Board decisions not be internally inconsistent and that apparent
contradictions be explained. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority, however, found the two
lines of cases were not "unreconcilable," refusing to require that the Board itself explain or justify
what may initially appear to be inconsistencies. Id. at 1550-51.
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, viewed the case as

presenting only a factual question, the Board's resolution of which he found was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Id. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). By casting the
issue as one of fact, Justice Scalia was able to reconcile his dissenting position with his strong reading
of Chevron. He found Chevron inapplicable because he viewed Curtin Matheson as raising only a
factual dispute. Id. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed with that characterization:
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These recent decisions confirm the considerable lawmaking authority the
Board possesses and the appropriate standard of judicial review. The courts
must defer to the Board's decisions, unless the decisions are at odds with clearly
expressed congressional intent or represent "irrational" policy choices. 121
How does this standard of review impact upon nonacquiescence? As set
forth below, it can be viewed as supporting nonacquiescence at the agency
level.12 2 But more importantly, it suggests that the occasions for Board nonacquiescence would be limited if the reviewing courts were to swallow hard and
accept the Chevron standard of review.123
The circuit courts, before and after Chevron, have refused to defer to Board
lawmaking. Instead, they have criticized the Board when it has refused to ac-

quiesce in circuit decisions.12 4 The Second Circuit, for example, has consistently refused to enforce the Board's "Gissel" bargaining orders (bargaining
orders issued despite the absence of a union election victory) when the Board has
Whether the Board permissibly refused to adopt a general presumption applicable to all
cases of this type is not an evidentiary question concerning the facts of this particular case.
The substantial evidence standard is therefore inapplicable to the issue before us. Rather,
we must determine whether the Board's refusal to adopt the presumption is rational and
consistent with the Act.
Id. at 1545 n.2.
121. See Kafker, supra note 5, at 152 (recognizing the Board as the "superior arbiter of the
meaning of the statute in particular contexts").
Long before Chevron, Professor Winter recognized the need for judicial deferral to Board lawmaking. See supranotes 80-83. He urged the courts to scrutinize more carefully the Board's factual
findings, however, saying that in doing so, the reviewing courts can ensure that the law is being
applied evenhandedly. See Winter, supra note 80, at 75. He also would use the "substantial evidence" level of deference to Board factual findings only when the Board has affirmed the findings of
its AL.L Id. One circuit recently adopted this approach. Weather Shield Mfg. Inc. v. NLRB, 890
F.2d 52, 57 (7th Cir. 1989).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 170-71.
123. Although not endorsing Board nonacquiescence, Mr. Kafker's article points out that Board
frustration with judicial interference may explain the Board's nonacquiescence policy. As he
explains:
Nonacquiescence can be seen as a defense mechanism when the Board is confronted with a
clear example of the courts of appeals stepping out of their role as reviewers of Board
decisions and arrogating to themselves the Board's administrative responsibility. Given the
limitations on the Board's capacity to have its rulings reviewed and reinstated by the
Supreme Court, the Board believes nonacquiescence is the only ready means of assuring
Congress's objective of a national labor policy formulated by an experienced and expert
tribunal.
Kafker, supra note 5, at 150-51; see also Strauss, supra note 5, at 1114-15 (indicating that a formal
policy of nonacquiescence is reasoned policy).
124. See Kafker, supra note 5, at 154-56, and Zimmerman & Dunn, supra note 28, at 19, for
discussions of circuit court decisions in which the authors assert that proper deference to the Board
was not accorded. In United Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1987), for example, the Second Circuit refused to accept the Board's view that a company ban on certain car displays was not an 8(a)(1) violation. Id. at 879. Saying that the Board had misread not only the
statute but also prior judicial interpretations of it, the court set the Board's order aside. Id. at 88082. Of course, it is the Board's interpretation, not the reviewing court's, that is entitled to deference.
See supra notes 94-118 and accompanying text. The court also criticized the Board for departing
from prior Board interpretations. United Technologies Corp., 814 F.2d at 882. Such departures,
however, are no basis for judicial criticisms. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct.
1542, 1549 (1990); see supra note 119.
For an illustration of the judiciary's unwillingness to recognize the Board's lawmaking authority, see Weis, supra note 8. Judge Weis minimizes the deference reviewing courts owe the Board.
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failed to consider subsequent events or when "hallmark" violations are not present.1 25 Moreover, the Second Circuit has chastised the Board when it fails to
adopt the court-constructed "Gissel" standards. Determining the standards for
issuance of a "Gissel" bargaining order, however, is statutory gap-filling committed to the Board's discretion, 126 a policy choice for the Boaxd to make.
Ambiguous statutory language also presents policy choices for the
Board.1 27 A reviewing court's belief that the Board has "misread" a statute is
no basis for refusing to enforce a Board order, so long as the Board's reading is

within the realm of reasonableness.12 8 But considering themselves the branch of
government responsible for statutory interpretation, the courts too often have

given the Board little deference when a question of statutory construction is
involved,12 9 thereby setting the stage for later nonacquiescence by the Board.
Nonacquiescence stems from the Board's view that a national statute
should be applied uniformly nationwide.1 30 The Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the appropriateness of nonacquiescence. Through Chevron, however,

the Court not only has limited the occasions for nonacquiescence but also has
helped achieve national uniformity by directing the lower courts to defer to

agency interpretations of their governing statutes.1 3 1 As Professor Pierce has
observed, judges frequently may differ in their interpretations of ambiguous stat-

utes, but they generally should agree on whether a statute is silent or ambigu125. See, eg., NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1980).
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Supreme Court approved the Board's
discretionary authority to issue a bargaining order as a remedy for unfair labor practices that undermine election proceedings or make the holding of a fair election unlikely.
126. See Zimmerman, supra note 27, at 2 n.2. As Professor Estreicher also points out, the Second Circuit in Jamaica Towing "was embarking in a debatable enterprise when it acted to secondguess the Board's assessment of the impact of acknowledged violations." Estreicher, supra note 90,
at 1090. Professor Estreicher criticizes the Second Circuit for provoking the Board's nonacquiescence. At the same time, however, he chastises the Board for not acquiescing "when it appeared
with fair certainty" that a particular circuit would hear a case. Id. at 1078.
Professor Estreicher's view apparently has changed. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,
supra note 8, at 714-42. Chevron perhaps played no small part in this conversion. In his earlier
article, Professor Estreicher found judicial deference to an agency's statutory interpretations "analytically questionable." Estreicher, supra note 90, at 1068. Chevron and its progeny, however, confirm that such deference must occur. Possibly, the Court's recognition that statutory interpretation
involves policy choices and its confirmation that policy choices are for agencies, not courts, to make
has influenced Professor Estreicher's view on the acquiescence issue. See Estreicher & Revesz, Non-

acquiescence, supra note 8, at 724-25.

127. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. The appropriateness of health care bargaining units is but one example of a statutory construction issue on which proper deference did not occur. Statutory silences and ambiguities left to
the Board a question of policy. What the courts found, however, was a question of statutory construction that the judiciary was better suited to answer. Zimmerman & Dunn, supra note 28, at 1213; see, eg., Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. St.
Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 414 (9th Cir. 1979); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 590
(3d Cir. 1977). Interestingly, it was the Board's failure to acquiesce in these circuit court rulings that
prompted judicial ire over nonacquiescence. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965,
970-71 (3d Cir. 1979).
130. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
131. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1119. Professor Strauss views Chevron as a method for obtaining national uniformity of statutes by giving more deference to agencies.
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ous. 132 Upon finding statutory silence or ambiguity, any rational agency

interpretation will prevail nationwide. That interpretation will prevail even if
the agency changes its reading from time to time, so long as the varied readings
are rational. Thus, careful adherence to Chevron promotes the Board's goal,
133
endorsed by the Court, of uniform application of the NLRA.

But observing the Chevron limits of judicial review will merely reduce, not
eliminate, nonacquiescence. The reviewing court, under Chevron's step one,
may find congressional intent not only clear but clearly at odds with the agency's

view. 134 Moreover, under Chevron's step two, the reviewing court may find the
agency's policy choice to be "irrational."' 135 It is those difficult cases that most

forcefully present the question of the lawfulness of Board nonacquiescence.
III.
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Determining the lawfulness of Board action requires a recognition of the
two separate stages of nonacquiescence: nonacquiescence at the agency decisionmaking stage and nonacquieseence at the appellate review stage. 137 The
132. Pierce, supra note 87, at 313.
133. See id.; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1119. Chevron, says Professor Pierce, gives judges
less room to infuse their personal political principles in the Nation's policy making process,
[allowing] judges of widely differing political perspectives to agree in a large number of
cases that Congress did or did not resolve a particular policy issue. This should reduce the
unfortunate tendency of judges to engage in policymaking disguised as interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language.
Pierce, supra note 87, at 313.
134. See, eg., North American Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 598-99 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ithaca College v.
NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980).
As Justice Scalia has pointed out, determining whether a statute is clear is where "future battles
...will be fought." Scalia, supra note 75, at 521. To the extent a court views a statute as clear, there
is less need to defer to the agency's view of the statute. Id. This potential for dispute over a statute's
clarity is described by Justice Scalia as "the chink in Chevron's armor." Id. at 520.
135. See, eg., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990) (recognizing and applying the "not irrational" standard to Board policymaking).
136. See Strauss, supranote 5, at 1122 (finding nonacquiescence "far less acceptable" if it occurs
after Chevron deference previously was applied by the reviewing court).
137. The courts have been critical of nonacquiescence, whether it occurs when the General
Counsel issues a complaint at odds with circuit law, see, eg., Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748,
751 (11th Cir. 1983); or when an AL refuses to follow circuit law in issuing a recommended decision and order, see, eg., PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 822-23 (4th Cir. 1982); or when
the Board itself rejects circuit law in its own decisions, see, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608

F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1979). They also have criticized the Board for nonacquiescing when the
Board insists on its position during judicial review. See Kubitschek, supra note 8, at 404; Strauss,
supra note 5, at 1107.
Some commentators view nonacquiescence as occurring only at the agency level. See Coenen,
supra note 8, at n.38; Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 687-88; Maranville,
supra note 8, at 475; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1830-32. Thereafter, the agency is seeking only to
relitigate the issue before the court of appeals. The agency's prior nonacquiescence enables it to
relitigate the issue by keeping the agency's position alive.
The courts, however, make no such distinction. They do not distinguish between an agency's
decisionmaking and its litigation stance, characterizing both as nonacquiescence. When the Board
adheres to its position before the appeals court, it is choosing not to acquiesce or to capitulate to
circuit law. The courts thus commonly and correctly understand both stages to involve nonacquiescence. See, eg., Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The courts, however, fail to analyze these stages separately.
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point at which nonacquiescence occurs shapes analysis of its lawfulness. 138 One
could argue, for example, that nonacquiescence by the Board at the agency decisionmaking level is lawful, largely because of venue uncertainty, while nonacquiescence before the court of appeals is not. Courts .and academics for the most
part have failed to distinguish clearly between these levels of nonacquiescence,
either condemning or, less frequently, condoning Board nonacquiescence re139
gardless of the level at which it occurs.

My conclusion is that nonacquiescence is lawful and appropriate at both

the agency and appellate court levels. The broad venue provisions of the National Labor Relations Act make nonacquiescence at the agency level relatively
easy to defend. 14 0 While venue uncertainty vanishes once a Board order is
before a particular circuit court, nonacquiescence still remains lawful, given the
14 1
unique characteristics of the agency as litigant.
4. Nonacquiescence at the Agency Level
When the General Counsel issues a complaint and the Board and its administrative law judges decide a case, they cannot know with certainty which court
of appeals will review their decisions. No matter where the case arose or where
14 2
the parties transact business, the D.C. Circuit is always a potential forum.
Most unions and employers, moreover, transact business in multiple circuits or
even nationwide. 143 Under the NLRA, parties are free to petition any of the
available circuits for review. 144 In addition, the Board frequently does not know
all the circuits in which a party resides or transacts business and thus is unaware
45
of the circuits in which review could be sought.'
Accordingly, nonacquiescence at the Board level raises the question: To
which circuit's law is the Board expected to acquiesce? Is the Board bound

nationwide by the first circuit that rules against it, simply because that circuit is
a possible review forum? 146 What if various circuits disagree on the Board's
138. See infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 137.
140. See infra notes 142-72 and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, venue affects the lawfulness of nonacquiescence. As Professor Jaffe observed, "The single most important variable in review
procedure, particularly federal, is venue." L. JAFFE, supra note 77, at 155.
141. See infra notes 173-202 and accompanying text.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988). Under the statute, the aggrieved party has the additional option
of seeking review in the D.C. Circuit. Thus, if the aggrieved party transacts business only in the
circuit in which the case arose, it still could seek review in the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Estreicher &
Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 712, 742 (discussing the Board's difficulties in predicting

venue).
143. Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. 753, 757 (1987); see Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence,
supra note 8, at 604 ("Courts have broadly interpreted the phrase 'transacts business,' so any multistate business has a variety of circuit choices.").

144. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988).
145. Such information need not and thus frequently may not be part of the record before the
Board. Furthermore, an aggrieved party, at the time it petitions for review, may be transacting
business in different or in additional locations than it did at the time of the hearing.
146. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 739; infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing and rejecting this alternative). But cf.Comment, supranote 8, at 847 (advorating that agencies should be bound nationwide by an adverse circuit court decision).
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position? If the Board applies the law of Circuit A and the employer wins, the
union will be the aggrieved party and will seek a circuit hospitable to its position. If the Board instead applies the law of Circuit B and the union wins, the
employer will be the aggrieved party, and if venue lies, will seek review in Circuit A. In this not-uncommon scenario, acquiescence to the law of one circuit is
nonacquiescence to the law of another. 14 7 What if all circuits that have considered the question have disagreed with the Board, but other circuits have yet to
confront the particular question? Is the Board nonacquiescing when it decides

the case in accordance with its own views, knowing the likelihood of success in
148

the circuits, while possible, is small?
This venue uncertainty has led some recent commentators correctly to conclude that nonacquiescence by the Board at the agency level is lawful. Professor
Schwartz, who finds much agency nonacquiescence an unconstitutional abuse of
shared Article III power, recognizes the constitutionality of nonacquiescence in
the face of venue choice. 14 9 The agency cannot know which precedent will be
applicable and thus does not abuse judicial power by rejecting "governing" law.
The presence of multiple venues makes the law of no particular circuit governing
or controlling.1 50
Professors Estreicher and Revesz also rely on venue choice to distinguish
nonacquiescence by the Board from nonacquiescence by other agencies. They
point out that the same reasons that legitimate intercircuit nonacquiescencewhich include allowing for percolation of ideas among the circuits, permitting
agencies and courts to compare the consequences of different legal rules, and
assisting the Supreme Court in identifying difficult issues and resolving them on
151
the merits-similarly justify nonacquiescence in the face of venue choice.
Were Board acquiescence required, the Board would be forced to conform its
rulings to the first circuit that rejected its position in order to assure that future
nonacquiescence would not occur, a result at odds with the geographically restricted scope of the circuits and with the benefits served by multiple circuit

147. See Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. 753, 757-58 (1987) (discussing this possibility),
148. The degree of uncertainty should not alter the lawfulness of nonacquiescence. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 687 n.34. Even if the Board were fairly confident of where the case would be reviewed, it still could not be certain and thus would not be rejecting
any "controlling" law. Id. at 712, 742; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1857 n.159.
Professors Estreicher, Revesz, and Schwartz, however, would limit Board nonacquiescence
"when all the circuits in which an action for judicial review might be brought have rejected the
agency's position." Schwartz, supranote 1, at 1857. As a practical matter, as set forth above, this is
not a realistic concern. The Board cannot know in which circuits venue will lie. See supra notes
143-45. Only if every circuit had rejected the Board's position could the Board know it would be in
an inhospitable forum. In the history of the Act, the Board has never adhered to a position in the

face of rejection from all 12 circuits. Nor is it likely to in the future, given the Board's practice of
carefully considering the views of the courts of appeals. See supra note 27.
149. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1856-57.
150. Id.

151. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 735-43. While acknowledging the
lawfulness of agency-level nonacquiescence by the NLRB, the Schwartz, Estreicher, and Revesz
articles focus on the lawfulness of "pure" intracircuit nonacquiescence by other agencies, that is,
nonacquiescence occurring in the face of venue certainty. Professor Coenen also focuses on this
form of nonacquiescence-nonacquiescence "occurring when the decisionmakers know their actions
are reviewable by that, and no other, circuit court." Coenen, supra note 8, at 6.
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review of an issue.1 5
Because Congress has given no circuit exclusive authority over the Board,
either in general or in resolving any particular group of cases, the most powerful
arguments against nonacquiescence lack compelling force. Stare decisis, if it is
applicable to agency decisionmaking, cannot control Board-level decisions because the Board cannot know to which law it must defer.1 53 The specter of
defiance toward judicial authority that underlies most separation of powers arguments similarly is missing when the Board cannot know which circuit ultimately will review its actions. 154 Nor is nonacquiescence a deprivation of any
due process right to application of the "controlling law" in adjudication of
claims, when it is unclear which"law controls.1 55 Furthermore, compelling ac152. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 735-43. As the authors point out,
not only would adverse decisions truncate further dialogue, but they would also dominate
decisions that are favorable to the agency. The result would be a one-way ratchet in which
the authoritative voice would be that of the first court of appeals to rule against the

agency.... A system in which the decision of the first court of appeals to rule against the
agency-even in the presence of several decisions favorable to the agency-becomes binding law nationwide is inconsistent with [Chevron's premise that agencies are the primary
policymakers].
Id. at 738-39.
153. Whether stare decisis applies at all to agency-level decisionmaking has been debated forcefully. Some have contended that just as lower courts are bound by circuit court rulings, so, too, are
administrative agencies. See, eg., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1880; Weis, supra note 8, at 852; Note,
IntracircuitNonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 595-97; Note, Denying PrecedentialEffect, supra note
8, at 181. These commentators reason that because agencies exercise judicial or quasi-judicial authority and because their decisions are subject to judicial review, agencies are bound by stare decisis.
However, agencies are not courts but are part of the executive branch, where flexibility is especially important. Maranville, supra note 8, at 501-04. Professor Maranville contends that "[i]n sum,
stare decisis and the controlling case doctrine are not clearly applicable to administrative agencies,
and the policies justifying those doctrines do not necessarily support their extension to agencies."
Id. at 504.
Whatever its applicability to agency action in general, stare decisis logically cannot apply when
venue is uncertain. There is no way for the Board to determine what law it must regard as controlling. See, ag., Modjeska, supranote 8, at 416; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1856-57; Note, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 604.
154. See, eg., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1856-57 ("The availability of alternative venue for
judicial review signals that the court that rendered the precedent adverse to the agency lacks exclusive authority to dictate the law to be applied to the adjudication of the case before the agency.").
Whether the separation of powers argument should constrain nonacquiescence in the absence of
venue choice is a different issue. For discussion of this issue, see Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 723-32; Maranville, supra note 8, at 522-28.
155. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1856. For a discussion of whether a due process challenge to
agency nonacquiescence otherwise can be launched, see Coenen, supra note 8, at 9-11; Maranville,
supranote 8, at 518-21; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1828 n.37; Comment, FederalAgencyNonacquiescence: Defining and Enforcing ConstitutionalLimitationson Bad FaithAgency Adjudication, 38 ME.
L. REV. 185, 231-59 (1986).
Any due process challenge to Board decisionmaking, moreover, that otherwise might exist is
further weakened by the fact that Board orders are not self-enforcing. Thus, no deprivation can
occur until after judicial review. This procedure should be contrasted with the administrative
scheme of the Social Security Administration, in which benefits are cut off following an unfavorable
agency ruling, and the claimant must go to court to get benefits reinstated. In that situation, not
only is a claimant deprived of governing circuit law, but he is immediately disadvantaged unless and
until he successfully appeals. No such scenario exists under the NLRA.
Similarly, the specter of unequal treatment of the rich and poor, in the sense that those who
have money to appeal will win while those who do not will lose-a forceful argument that has been
accepted in the context of nonacquiescence by the Social Security Administration-is of little force
in labor cases. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd in part, 725 F.2d
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quiescence in the face of venue choice is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
rejection of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. 156 The ad-

vantages of percolation and law development relied upon by the Court in rejecting nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government, as Estreicher and
Revesz recognize, are incompatible with mandating acquiescence by the Board,
because acquiescence would stifle percolation and law development by requiring
the Board to follow the law of the first circuit to reject its position. 15 7

While venue choice makes nonacquiescence constitutional, it does not, according to some commentators, make nonacquiescence sound policy. Rather,
they claim the Board should apply the law of the circuit in which the claim
arose. 158 On review, the circuit court, if it is not the circuit in which the claim
arose, should not penalize the Board for nonacquiescence but instead should
recognize the Board already has "acquiesced" to a different circuit's law. 159

This approach, they argue, would minimize conflict with the reviewing courts
and would respect what they believe is the courts' superior role in saying what
the law is. 160

The problems with this approach are numerous. First, one can easily imagine cases in which identifying the circuit "in which the case arose" would be

difficult at best. 161 Second, the resource demands of requiring the General

1489 (9th Cir.), vacated, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984). As commentators have noted, litigants before the
NLRB "tend to be relatively affluent and sophisticated and thus more likely to appeal." Kafker,
supra note 5, at 143. Whereas nonacquiescence by the SSA
pits defenseless individuals against a large and powerful bureaucracy[,] . .
[n]onacquiescence by the NLRB, by contrast, takes place in a multiparty context. The
practice will have a consistent substantive effect of favoring unions or management only if
the NLRB and the judiciary have consistent and opposing predilections. Many, though
certainly not all, of the affected unions and employers will have substantive resources for
obtaining judicial relief or for approaching Congress on the merits of underlying issues.
Thus, all parties affected by NLRB nonacquiescence benefit from the practice on occasion,
and the need for resolution of the issue may seem less pressing than in the case of the SSA.
Maranville, supra note 8, at 533-34.
156. In United States v. Mendoza, the Supreme Court disapproved the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the federal government. 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). For further discussion of
Mendoza, see infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
157. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 741-43.
158. See Dotson & Williamson, supra note 8, at 745; Ferguson & Bordoni, supra note 8, at 220;
Weis, supra note 8, at 851.
159. Circuit courts currently chastise the Board for nonacquiescence to circuit law even when
the claim did not arise in the reviewing circuit. See, eg., Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB,
721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ferguson & Bordoni, supra note 8, at 202, 210; Strauss, supra
note 5, at 1111. Were the circuit courts to apply the law of the circuit in which the claim arose, it
"would work a fundamental change in the conventional wisdom that underlies section 10(f) review
in the District of Columbia Circuit." Ferguson & Bordoni, supra note 8, at 220. Congress perhaps
gave the option of resort to that circuit with the intent that the D.C. Circuit would not be bound by
the law of another, possibly less hospitable, circuit. Id. at 221-22.
160. See Dotson & Williamson, supra note 8, at 744-45; Ferguson & Bordoni, supra note 8, at
211-16; Weis, supra note 8, at 852.
161. For example, if an employer is charged with a "runaway shop" violation, is the circuit in
which the claim arose the one in which the old plant was closed, the one in which the new one was
opened, or the one in which corporate headquarters are located and the decision to close was made?
But cf. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 766 (acknowledging such difficulties
would exist but claiming they would be "rare"). Certainly such problems will not arise in every case,
but with the large number of multistate actors involved in Board proceedings, labelling these disputes as "rare" seems unwarranted.
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Counsel, the Board, and their staffs to ascertain and apply the law differently in
different parts of the country are considerable. 162 Even leaving these practical
problems aside, one must conclude that agency-level nonacquiescence is both

appropriate and desirable.
Applying the law of the circuit in which the claim arose does eliminate
uncertainty in knowing which circuit's law to apply, but it wreaks havoc with
uniformity. While nonacquiescence admittedly does not obtain ultimate uniformity after judicial review, it at least maintains uniformity at the agency
level.1 63 Were the Board to administer the law differently in different parts of
the country, the NLRA's goal of promoting a uniform national labor policy
would be undermined. 16 If national labor law varied from one part of the country to another, regions would be better able to compete for industry on the basis
of more hospitable circuit law. Such competition is at odds with the nationalization of labor law.165
Nor is deferral to judge-made law consistent with Congress's creation of the
162. [S]ince approximately 40,000 or more unfair labor practice charges are filed annually,
the mind boggles at the thought of the General Counsel attempting to predict, analyze and
apply "relevant" circuit doctrine. One suspects that the fallout from any such process
would have a devastating impact upon the General Counsel's impressive settlement rate of
approximately 95%.
Modjeska, supra note 8, at 425; see also Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supranote 8, at 69091 (noting the practical difficulties of applying the law differently in different regions); Maranville,
supra note 8, at 493-94 (discussing the difficulties of having lower-level staff "acquiesce" to circuit

law).
163. Critics of nonacquiescence have denigrated this Board-level uniformity, saying that it is not
"meaningful" because the circuit courts apply circuit law and thus labor policy ultimately is not
uniform. Accordingly, they claim, uniformity is not an appropriate justification for nonacquiescence. All nonacquiescence accomplishes, they argue, is protracted litigation that favors those with
money to appeal. Ferguson & Bordoni, supra note 8, at 216-17; Kafker, supra note 5, at 142-43.
As set forth in Part IV, routine application of the law of the circuit when reviewing Board
decisions destroys national uniformity. The solution urged here is for the circuit courts to relax their
grip on circuit law. See infra notes 224-68 and accompanying text.
Even under the present system, however, Board-level uniformity is important. It enables the
Board and General Counsel to dispose of the vast majority of cases without a formal hearing. See
Modjeska, supra note 8, at 425. Unions, employers, and their lawyers can rely on the law as developed and applied by the Board, free from trying to ascertain which circuit's law should apply and
what the law of that circuit is. Moreover, even if ultimate uniformity is not achieved, uniformity at
the agency level promotes a sense of fairness and evenhandedness by the agency. See Estreicher &
Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 748.
164. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 748 (noting the importance of
"equal treatment of regulatees or claimants regardless of where in this country the dispute or claim

arose").
165. Meador, A Challenge to JudicialArchitecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the US.
Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 623 (1989) ("The economic and competitive factors
involved in [NLRB cases] strongly indicate an unusual need for nationwide uniformity of treat-

ment.").

As Estreicher and Revesz explain:
Another central goal of federal regulation is to prevent regions from competing for industry by offering a more favorable economic climate at the expense of other societal goals.
For example, federal regulation in the labor field can be justified, in part, as an attempt to
prevent interstate competition for industry at the expense of worker protection. If one
circuit takes a more restrictive view than does the NLRB of what constitutes a mandatory
subject for collective bargaining, employers in that circuit have more entrepreneurial flexibility, and perhaps lower labor costs, than their counterparts in other circuits, creating
incentives for new industry to establish itself in that circuit and for existing industry to
move there from other circuits.
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NLRB. Congress wanted labor policy formulated by an expert agency that possesses a necessary flexibility. 1 66 If circuit law were to govern the Board, not only
would Board level uniformity be lost, but the Board's ability to change its position in response to shifting political climates or agency experience would be lost
as well.

167

In addition, the Board's "senior partner" role in policymaking renders it
understandably reluctant to consider itself bound by circuit rulings.168 Were the
Board bound bkr the law of the circuit in which a case arose, it would be bound

not only by rulings occurring after proper Chevron deference was accorded but
also by rulings that improperly encroached on Board lawmaking. While the
judiciary's failure to observe Chevron would not immunize unlawful nonacquiescence, 169 it does explain the Board's refusal to adopt a nonacquiescence posture
neither constitutionally nor statutorily required.170
The Board's policy decision not to adopt the law of the circuit in which the
unfair labor practice occurred, moreover, is itself due deference under Chevron.
The statute does not require acquiescence to circuit law. The Board's view that
the multiple venue provisions are inconsistent with adopting a policy of deferring to the law of the circuit in which the case arose is an exercise of discretion
deserving of Chevron deference.
Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 748. But see Coenen, supra note 8, at 59-60
(questioning whether firms make location decisions based on circuit law).
While maintaining that the NLRA's broad venue provisions make Board nonacquiescence lawful, Estreicher and Revesz nonetheless propose that the NLRA should be amended to provide venue
certainty. They urge this in large part to reduce the tension that presently exists between the Board
and courts caused by Board nonacquiescence. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8,
at 764-70.
This proposal, however, is inconsistent with their recognition, quoted above, of the adverse
effects of "competing" circuit law. Those effects perhaps explain Congress's choice of the broad and
uncertain venue provisions that presently govern review of Board decisions and weigh heavily
against the venue-certain scheme proposed by Estreicher and Revesz.
Because appellate courts presently adhere to circuit law, some of this regional competition is
now possible and is a powerful inducement for eliminating the law of the circuit in cases of Board
nonacquiescence. See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text. Board acquiescence and venue
certainty would exacerbate, not eliminate, regional competition.
166. See Kafker, supra note 5, at 152; Modjeska, supra note 8,at 406-09; Winter, supra note 80,
at 54-67.
As explained by former Board member Zimmerman:
Courts should view the Board's nonacquiescence position as protecting the statutory
rights of the charging parties, in whose name the case is brought, and not as impugning the
authority of the court. A charging party is entitled to the enforcement of his statutory
rights, as recognized by the Board, no matter where those rights were violated. For the
Board to deny a charging party the relief it concludes is warranted under its considered
view of the statute simply because the likely circuit court of review has ruled otherwise,
comes close to an abdication of the Board's responsibilities.
Zimmerman, supra note 27, at 5.
167. See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124,
1135-36 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
168. Modjeska, supra note 8,at 406-09 (relying upon the Board's "senior partner" status in
policymaking and its expertise to defend the Board's nonacquiescence policy); see also Maranville,
supra note 8, at 492 (recognizing an agency's "territorial imperative" makes it unwilling to concede
authority to the courts).
169. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1902 n.352.
170. Kafker, supra note 5, at 150; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1114-16.
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Agency-level nonacquiescence by the Board is thus permissible. The broad
venue provisions governing judicial review insulate the Board from any constitu-

tional attack.1 71 As a matter of policy, moreover, Board nonacquiescence is
1 72
sound and is entitled to deference from the reviewing courts.

B.

Nonacquiescence at the Circuit Court Level

Uncertainty in knowing which circuit will review a case validates nonacquiescence at the agency level. Once review is sought, however, that uncertainty is
removed. The Board, as a party, now knows which circuit will review its order.

Yet the Board, in the face of contrary circuit precedent, refuses to concede error.
The Board instead presents its view of the law to the circuit, insisting upon its

right to "respectfully disagree" with circuit precedent.
This stage of nonacquiescence most enrages the judiciary.1 73 Given the

Board's authority to make law free from the constraints of circuit court precedent, however, the courts are unjustifiably angered at the Board's subsequent

defense of its law.
When the Board is before the circuit court for review of its decision, the

Board is a litigant, not a lawmaker. As a litigant, the Board cannot encroach on
the judicial power. Thus, as explained below, the "separation of powers" and

"stare decisis" arguments used by the courts to condemn the Board are mis-

placed when the Board is nonacquiescing at the appellate review level.
The courts, moreover, must recognize the Board as a special litigant. The
Board is responsible for administering and applying a national law. When the
Board appears before a court advocating a position at odds with circuit law but

in keeping with its national position, it is exercising its responsibility for main-

taining an expert and uniform view of the statute. 174 While the circuit courts
are free to reject that position, the advocacy of it is no basis for judicial
sanctions. 175

In criticizing Board nonacquiescence, the circuits unanimously have relied
171.
172.
173.
note 5,

See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supranote 8, at 712, 742; see also Strauss, supra
at 1111 (noting that courts too often fail to recognize the Board's uncertainty in predicting

venue).

Estreicher and Revesz, in their extensive work on nonacquiescence, focus only on the lawfulness
of nonacquiescence at the agency decisionmaking level. As they state: "From our perspective, what
is relevant is the conduct of the agency at the time of the administrative proceedings, not the posture
in which the agency finds itself when it gets to court." Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra
note 8, at 742, 688. This position overlooks the fact that when the Board adheres to its view of the
Act after a reviewing circuit has been identified, the Board is at that point refusing to acquiesce in
the law of the reviewing circuit.
174. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 724; Kafker, supra note 5, at
152; Modjeska, supra note 8, at 407-16; Zimmerman, supra note 27, at 3-5.
175. Mr. Zimmerman states:
In most instances the Board's position does not disregard the law of the circuit, but attempts to better articulate a principle or emphasize a point it thinks may persuade the
court to reconsider its view. While the court obviously retains power to disagree and to
reverse, the Board fulfills its mandate when it asks the court simply to reconsider.
Zimmerman, supra note 27, at 3; see also Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 741,
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on Marbury v. Madison's directive that it is up to the judiciary to "say what the
law is."'176 They claim that when the Board fails to abide by circuit law, it is
violating separation of powers principles. 177 Marbury, however, is weak support
for any argument against nonacquiescence. 17 Marbury establishes only that a
court's decision will be controlling in the case in which it was issued; it does not
elevate the decision to a controlling rule of law. 179 More important, venue
choice makes a Marbury argument of little use in challenging agency level decisionmaking by the Board because venue uncertainty makes "what the law is"an
0
unknown.18
Separation of powers arguments, moreover, are misplaced when directed at
nonacquiescence at the circuit court level. At that point, the Board is not exercising any judicial power and thus is not encroaching on the territory of the
judiciary branch. Rather, at the appellate level, the court alone is exercising
judicial power. The court is exercising its powers of judicial review, under
which it has the authority to reject the Board's position and to "say what the law
is." When the board simply asks the court to accept a position at odds with
circuit law, it does not violate any separation of powers principles.181
Nor does "stare decisis" provide a legitimate basis for criticizing Board
nonacquiescence at the circuit-court level. Stare decisis, as discussed previously,
cannot be relied upon to condemn nonacquiescence at the agency level because
the Board cannot know which circuit's law it must follow. 182 Moreover, when
the Board is before the court of appeals, it is not exercising any "judicial" power
that would bring stare decisis into play. 183 The Board's order already has issued. The circuit court now shoulders the burden of deciding whether to follow
754 (urging that when nonacquiescence is lawful, remedial action is unwarranted); Estreicher &
Revesz, Reply, supra note 8, at 842 (same).

176. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137, 177 (1803).

177. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979); Kafter, supra
note 5, at 151-52; Maranville, supra note 8, at 499; Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 151
(noting courts' reliance on Marbury v. Madison).
178. Commentators routinely have so recognized. See, eg., Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquies.
cence, supra note 8, at 722-32; Maranville, supra note 8, at 522; Modjeska, supra note 8, at 417;
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1829; Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 161; Note, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 595; Note, supra note 44, at 748. But see Note, Executive Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 1152-53, 1159-63.
179. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 154.
181. Professor Schwartz, for example, who acknowledges the lawfulness of nonacquiescence in
the face of venue choice, condemns pure intracircuit, agency-level nonacquiescence as an abuse of
shared Article III power. Under his theory, if an agency is going to perform judicial functions, it
should act like a court in doing so. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1851-55. When appearing before a
court as a litigant, however, an agency is not performing any judicial function. Accordingly, Professor Schwartz's reasons for restricting nonacquiescence would not restrain the agency's litigation
conduct. Indeed, Professor Schwartz would find "tightly controlled" intracircuit relitigation itself
shielded by United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984), when the agency level nonacquiescence
is lawful. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1875-81. For further discussion of Mendoza, see infra notes
190-97 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
183. But see Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 596 (arguing that "stare decisis"
precludes litigants from acting in a manner inconsistent with circuit precedent). This argument
fails to account for the fact that stare decisis is a doctrine that directly governs the actions of courts,
not litigants. See Maranville, supra note 8, at 501; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1879-80.
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the law of the circuit. Thus, stare decisis affords no support for condemning
nonacquiescence at the circuit court level.
The courts, however, do expect litigants within the circuit to acknowledge
the force of circuit law.' 84 While the Board acknowledges the existence of adverse precedent and recognizes the court's power to deny enforcement based on
adverse circuit law, it does not concede that the law is dispositive. Rather, the
Board insists on its right to ask the court to reconsider its decision.18 5
Perhaps this practice so angers the courts because they fail to recognize the
Board's authority to make law without regard to circuit precedent.18 6 Opinions
condemning nonacquiescence criticize the Board for issuing an order at odds
with circuit law, not merely for adhering to that position during review proceedings.18 7 If the courts were to acknowledge the Board's freedom from circuit
precedent at the agency decisionmaking level, their hostility toward nonacquiescence at the circuit level no doubt would be tempered. 183 Moreover, once the
courts admit the lawfulness of nonacquiescence at the agency level, the use of
judicial sanctions-such as injunctions, contempt citations, and attorneys' feesshould be viewed as inappropriate responses to the Board's litigation position. A
review of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mendoza18 9 helps
illustrate why courts should hesitate to penalize the Board for litigation conduct
designed to advance its nationally uniform view of the statute.
In United States v. Mendoza the Supreme Court, in refusing to apply nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the United States, recognized that
the government stands in a different posture from private litigants. 190 "[T]he
nature of the issues the government litigates," the Court stated, calls for relaxation of legal principles applicable to other litigants. 191 The Court recognized,
moreover, that the government, unlike other litigants, cannot always petition the
Court for review of circuit court decisions with which it disagrees. The Solicitor
General must balance a large group of cases and consider the Court's docket
before authorizing a certiorari petition. 192 If the government were bound by
adverse rulings, the Solicitor General would be forced to appeal every decision
against the agency. 193 Without acquiescence, moreover, the Board could allow
circuit law to develop without fear that it would be precluded from asking a
184. See, eg., NLRB v. Blackstone Co., Inc., 685 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1982). The circuits
retain the power, moreover, to sanction parties for frivolous litigation. See Coenen, supra note 8,
n.515; Note, IntracircuitNonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 596.
185. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
186. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 742.
187. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
188. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 742 & n.307. Because of the
friction that does exist, however, Professors Estreicher and Revesz suggest that Congress eliminate
venue choice, which, as I have explained, is an unsatisfactory solution. See supra note 165.
189. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
190. Id. at 159-60 (1984). For a discussion of Mendoza's reasoning, see Modjeska, supra note 8,
at 412-15.
191. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159.
192. Id. at 160-61; see Strauss, supra note 5, at 1108 (discussing the constraints on the Solicitor

General).

193. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

court to reconsider its position.1 94
While Mendoza does not directly immunize nonacquiescence at the circuit
court level, 195 its reasoning suggests that commanding acquiescence is im-

proper.196 Certainly, requiring the Board to withdraw its petition for enforcement upon finding itself in a circuit with adverse precedent would relieve parties
of costs, would conserve judicial resources, and could prevent inconsistent decisions. But these same arguments were applicable and were rejected in Mendoza,
1 97
given the unique character of the government as litigant.

Furthermore, unlike other litigants, the Board is charged with developing a
national labor policy. While the courts may disagree with the Board's view of
the statute, they should be wary of punishing the executive branch merely for

asking the court to rethink a prior decision.1 9 8 Essentially, such a request is all
that circuit level nonacquiescence entails.
Certainly, the appeals court is free to apply the law of the circuit and set
aside the Board order. 199 To date, that routinely is what has happened, after the

court either pens harsh words regarding the Board's failure to acquiesce or issues ominous threats of future sanctions. 2° ° But these harsh words and threats
194. Modjeska, supra note 8, at 414; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1878.
195. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 685. Also, percolation among
the circuits could still occur through intercircuit nonacquiescence, even if intracircuit nonacquiescence were forbidden. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1878.
196. Modjeska, supranote 8, at 412-16; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1878-81; Note, supra note 44,
at 748-49.
197. Mendoza disposes of an argument that nonmutual collateral estoppel precludes nonacquiescence at the circuit level, as argued by some commentators. See Comment, supra note 8, at 857-61;
Note, Denying PrecedentialEffect, supra note 8, at 178-83. As Professor Schwartz correctly notes,
these arguments really are no more than attacks on Mendoza. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1877
nn.233-34. Any argument that Mendoza does not apply to intracircuit relitigation is "virtually exclude[d]" by Mendoza's holding. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1878 n.236; see also Maranville, supra
note 8, at 514 (discussing Mendoza and its effect on the legality of intracircuit relitigation).
Thus, courts cannot rely (and at least in the NLRB context they have not relied) upon nonmutual collateral estoppel to restrain nonacquiescence. Rather, circuit courts' remarks reflect a view
that the Board's litigation posture is frivolous or is contemptuous of circuit precedent, leading to
threats of sanctions. See, eg., NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Mgt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir.
1987); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
198. Indeed, when reviewing Board orders, even those issues that are at odds with circuit law,
the courts must remember they are reviewing policy choices made by a co-equal branch of government. Pierce, supra note 87, at 307-08.
Professor Modjeska relies upon the Board's success rate before the Supreme Court, in the face
of conflicting circuit precedent, as "a virtual validation of Mendoza principles. In cases too numerous to recount, the Board has prevailed in the Supreme Court notwithstanding substantial circuit
court rejection of the Board's position." Modjeska, supranote 8, at 414. This record, he points out,
counsels against circuit court stifling of the Board's position. Id. at 415. He adds Congress's failure
"to intrude upon the NLRB nonacquiescence policy, while amending the Act in various other respects on several occasions, suggests that the NLRB stance is in harmony with congressional notions
of national labor policy." Id. at 415-16.
199. "[A] previous rejection [of an agency's position] can be a sufficient condition for setting
aside the agency's action, but it is not a sufficient condition for enjoining [agency-level] nonacquiescence." Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supranote 8, at 754. As set forth below, I disagree
that prior adverse precedent should be viewed as a sufficient basis for a reviewing court to reject the
agency's position. See infra notes 224-68 and accompanying text.
200. See NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 1984); Yellow Taxi Co., 721
F.2d at 383; Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Blackstone Co.,
685 F.2d 102, 106 n.5 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated, 462 U.S. 1127 (1983); PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671
F.2d 817, 823 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1980);
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are misguided because the Board acts within its rights when it nonacquiesces at
the agency level and then defends its position on the merits in the courts of
20 1
appeals.
If the circuit courts, however, acknowledge the Board's right to nonacquiesce but then, in response, simply apply circuit law and deny enforcement of
the Board's order, the result is a stalemate that contributes little toward development of a nationally uniform law.202 To resolve this problem, the courts should
relax the law of the circuit doctrine when reviewing Board orders. The remainder of this Article is directed to this proposal.

IV.

RELAXING THE LAW OF THE CIRCUIT DOCTRiNE

Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of the English and American legal
systems. 20 3 This common-law doctrine is based on a desire for certainty and

predictability in the law.204 Respect for the law is fostered when like cases are

treated alike. Stare decisis assists in keeping the law uniform and impartial.2°5
Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228-29 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Mary
Thompson Hosp. Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB,

608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1252 (5th Cir.
1978).
201. See supra notes 143-98 and accompanying text.
202. See Kafker, supra note 5, at 159 (recognizing the Board and courts frequently have arrived
at "an impasse in decisionmaking"). Kafker recommends the Board and courts adopt a "collaborative" model of decisionmaking, asking the Board to better articulate its reasoning and asking the
reviewing courts, in cases of disagreement, to remand to the Board, rather than substituting their
judgment for the Board's. Id.
Professors Estreicher and Revesz, who approve Board nonacquiescence at the agency level, do
not advocate a departure from the law of the circuit doctrine. Rather, they assume that circuit
courts, through en bancs and other such established procedures for reconsidering precedent, will be
willing to overrule past decisions when such overrulings are necessary. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply,
supra note 8, at 836-37. In the meantime, they assume the law of the circuit will apply but advocate
that remedial measures should not be used against an agency that engages in lawful nonacquiescence
at the agency decisionmaking level. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 754.
Estreicher and Revesz rely on circuits' supposed willingness to formally revisit precedent as a
justification for their defense of "pure" intracircuit agency-level nonacquiescence, that is, nonacquiescence that occurs when venue is certain. They claim agencies must be permitted to nonacquiesce
at the agency level so that a vehicle for en banc review of circuit precedent will exist. Id.
In response to Estreicher and Revesz, Diller and Morawetz criticize as unfounded Estreicher's
and Revesz's assumption that circuits will be amenable to holding en bancs or using other formal
procedures to reconsider settled circuit law when faced with agency nonacquiescence. Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 8, at 804-09; see also Kubitschek, supra note 8, at 424-25 (similarly criticizing
Estreicher and Revesz on this point). Diller and Morawetz then proceed to explain why circuit law
should be stable and praise the courts' adherence to the law of the circuit. Diller & Morawetz, supra
note 8, at 807-11.
I agree with Diller and Morawetz that the formal reconsideration Estreicher and Revesz assume occurs in fact is not occurring. Instead, the circuits rely on the law or the circuit to deny
enforcement of Board orders in nonacquiescence cases. See supra note 200; Kubitschek, supra note
8, at 404, 424-25. But unlike Diller, Morawetz, and Kubitschek, who focus on nonacquiescence by
the Social Security Administration and commend the circuit courts for adhering to precedent in
those cases, I see little value to the "law of the circuit" in cases of NLRB nonacquiescence. See infra
notes 203-78 and accompanying text
203. "Stare decisis is of course a doctrine peculiar to the English common law; it is not found in
civil law systems or in international law." J.MURPHY & R. RUETER, STARE DECIsIS IN COMMONWEALTH APPELLATE COURTS 3 (1981).
204. Id. at 93.
205. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921) ("There must be noth-
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Certainty and predictability enable persons to plan, to conduct their affairs,
and to determine whether to litigate or to settle disputes based on a knowledge

of the governing law. Without stare decisis, uncertainty concerning the law
would encourage repetitive litigation. Settlements, based largely on predictions

concerning the governing law, would be undermined. More important, persons
within a jurisdiction would be unable to structure their transactions or to conduct business with any confidence in what legal rules apply. One cannot conform his conduct to the law if he does not know what the law is or at least what
20 6
it is likely to be.
Furthermore, stare decisis aids judges in performing their work. As Justice
Cardozo once remarked, "the labor of judges would be increased almost to the
breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one
could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses
laid by others who had gone before him." 20 7 Additionally, regarding past decisions as binding is an act of courtesy and comity toward fellow judges that promotes civility within the courts. 20 8
If stare decisis applied intercircuit within our federal appellate system, a
panel decision in one circuit would be controlling nationwide. This approach
would further the values that underlie stare decisis. 2° 9 But stare decisis among
our federal circuits has been rejected. A decision by one circuit is of persuasive,
not binding, force in a sister circuit. 2 10 The advantages of percolation and of
providing the Supreme Court with different approaches to important issues are
seen as outweighing an unavoidable loss of uniformity. 2 11
Within each circuit, a rule of intracircuit stare decisis, commonly referred
to as the law of the circuit, obtains. 2 12 All circuits have adopted this practice,
and most have formalized it in their operating procedures. 2 13 A panel decision

ing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness. Therefore in
the main there shall be adherence to precedent.").
206. For a discussion of the benefits of stare decisis, see J. MURPHY & R. RUETER, supra note
203, at 93-97; Hellman, Jumboism & Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the
Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989).
207. B. CARDOZO, supra note 205, at 149.
208. J. MURPHY & R. RUETER, supra note 203, at 104.
209. These reasons have led some to advocate the adoption of intercircuit stare decisis, See, e.g.,
Vestal, supra note 21, at 176-79.
210. See R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 252; Maranville, supra note 8, at 485.
211. For defense of the present system, see R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 163-64, 256; Estrelcher
& Revesz, Reply, supra note 8, at 835-35. Judge Posner, however, believes that while a lack of
intercircuit stare decisis is good, the circuits presently give too little weight to each others' decisions.
R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 256. Moreover, he would find that if the first three circuits agree on an
issue of law, the remaining circuits should be bound. Id. at 165.
The reasoning in United States v. Mendoza, moreover, supports the lack of intercircuit stare
decisis. 464 U.S. 154, 163 (1984). Percolation aids the development of national law. See Estreicher
& Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 736-38; Revesz, Specialized Courtsand the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1156 (1990). But see Meador, supra note 165, at
634 (asserting that "[als applied to judicial interpretations of federal statutes, 'percolation' is a euphemism for incoherence").
212. See R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 252; Vestal, supra note 21, at 161.
213. See, eg., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Under the
Internal Operating Procedures of this court, one panel may not overrule a decision of a previous
panel."); see also J. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 187 (1981)
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is binding on district courts within the circuit and on other panels until over2 14
ruled by the circuit en bane or by the Supreme Court.
Intracircuit stare decisis generally promotes uniformity within the circuit.2 15 Like cases are decided alike, helping to avoid a perception that a result
depends upon the composition of the panel. More important, persons within the

jurisdiction can conform their conduct to circuit law. Persons can plan their
affairs or structure business transactions aware of the governing law. Lawyers
can advise clients on the merits of litigation or settlement by predicting the applicable law. District court judges, as well as subsequent panels, can decide
cases based on circuit law and avoid the need to decide every issue anew. Within
the circuit, moreover, collegiality is promoted when one panel's decision is fol-

lowed by other panels. Thus, intracircuit stare decisis in general promotes desir216
able goals.
Many of these bases for intracircuit stare decisis, however, are inapplicable
to decisions involving the NLRB. An employer, for example, may be located
within a circuit's geographic territory. .But that does not mean that circuit's law

necessarily will govern the employer's actions; another circuit may well review a
Board order and determine the law to be applied. 2 17 Thus, the law of the circuit
doctrine does not aid the employer in conforming its conduct to the law or structuring its transactions with the union.2 18 The goals of certainty and predictabil("Adherence to precedent remains the everyday, working rule of American law, enabling appellate
judges to control the premises of decision of subordinates who apply general rules to particular
cases."); Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 805 n.17 (providing a list of cases setting forth the rules
of each circuit); Hellman, supranote 206, at 545 ("[A]II of the courts of appeals are committed to the
rule of intracircuit stare decisis: panel decisinns are binding upon subsequent panels unless overruled by the court en banc.").
214. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedentin the Districtof Columbia Circuit,34 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 477, 480 (1986) ("Theoretically, of course, circuit judges are bound by circuit precedent
until it is overruled either by the circuit court itself, sitting en banc, or by the Supreme Court.").
Judge Wald goes on to assert, however, that judges do not always follow in practice what they have
committed to follow in theory. For a similar point of view, see J. HOWARD, supra note 213, at 210
("It is considered improper for one panel to overrule the decisions of another, though judges admitted that 'we fudge on it sometimes' by distinguishing cases, narrowing down rulings, and other
tactics.").
215. As recently stated:
By requiring adherence to prior panel decisions, the circuits are able to maintain a degree

of consistency within each circuit that would be impossible if each panel were entitled to
reject the conclusion of a prior panel. A system in which panels were free to overturn prior
panels would allow the law within each circuit to be in constant flux, and would deprive
the circuits of their ability to provide clear direction to parties and the lower courts. Rules
of stare decisis promote equality of treatment at the lower court level (as well as for those
who never seek judicial review) by giving clear guidance as to the rule of law.
Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 807.
216. For a discussion of the values of intracircuit stare decisis, see J. HOWARD, supra note 213,
at 210; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 806-08; Hellman, supra note 206, at 544-47.
Judge Posner, however, has suggested relaxing the law of the circuit when a subsequent circuit
rejects the prior circuit's point of view. "On what basis could the Third Circuit think its earlier
decision more authoritative than the Fourth Circuit's contrary decision? It ought to reexamine its
previous decision conscientiously and without preconceptions." R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 256.
Judge Posner is correct, especially when the administration of a national statute is at issue. His
recognition that the law of the circuit is not sacrosanct is in keeping with the premise advocated
here.
217. See supra notes 56-63, 147 and accompanying texts.
218. See J. MURPHY & I RUETER, supra note 203, at 106 (recognizing that when no reliance
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ity cannot be served by intracircuit stare decisis when it is impossible to know
which circuit's law will govern.
Moreover, there is no need to supply a body of governing law for the district courts. NLRB orders are directly reviewed by the circuit courts, which all
but eliminates district court involvement in Board orders.2 19 Nor can the
NLRB be governed by the law of the circuit because, as shown earlier, the General Counsel cannot know when it issues a complaint and the Board cannot
know when it makes its orders which circuit's law will apply.220 Thus, litigants,
lawyers, and "lower level" decisionmakers are not aided by application of intracircuit stare decisis.
There remain, however, underlying principles that are served by the law of
the circuit doctrine, even in NLRB review proceedings. Certainly, circuit court
time is saved when one panel disposes of a case on the basis of circuit law. 22'
Additionally, collegiality within the court is enhanced when panel decisions are
222
regarded as controlling.
These remaining interests are not strong enough to justify routine application of intracircuit stare decisis when reviewing Board orders. 223 A relaxation
of intracircuit stare decisis should occur, however, only in cases in which nonacquiescence is present, that is, in cases in which the Board is asking the circuit to
depart from a prior panel opinion.
A.

Benefits of Discardingthe Law of the Circuit Doctrine When Reviewing
Board Orders

The circuit court, entrusted with the task of judicial review, can deny enforcement of Board orders on the basis of "binding" circuit law.2 24 Although
applying the law of the circuit is usually within the court's power, this approach
fails to give full effect to the spirit of Chevron, which recognizes the agency's
substantial role in the lawmaking process.
There are some circumstances in which Chevron compels a departure from
the law of the circuit. When a reviewing panel upholds the Board's position as a
reasonable view of the statute and the Board later reverses itself and changes
interest is present, strict adherence to stare decisis is "an unnecessary fetter of judicial function"),
The authors advocate a departure from strict adherence to stare decisis for intermediate courts in the
Commonwealth system. See id. at 105-12.
219. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1988).
220. See supra notes 56-60, 147 and accompanying texts.
221. "If the decisions of the circuits were not accorded precedential weight, but were constantly
open to question, these courts could be easily overwhelmed by parties raising issues addressed in

earlier rulings by the same court. The system simply could not function if precedent were so unstable." Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 808.
222. See J. HOWARD, supra note 213, at 210.
223. See infra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
224. At issue here, with the exception noted infra in the text accompanying notes 225-30, is not

whether circuit courts have the power to deny enforcement based on circuit court precedent; it is
readily conceded that they do. Rather, the issue is whether that power should be exercised or instead should be held in check by the courts themselves.

1991]

NONACQUIESCENCE

course, a later panel must be able to defer to the Board's changed position free of
the constraints of circuit law.
The Ninth Circuit, en banc, has endorsed this view. 225 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that so long as the prior panel decision simply deferred to the Board
and did not hold the Board position to be the only reasonable reading of the
statute, subsequent panels may adopt new Board interpretations without an en
banc hearing. 226 The court recognized that adherence to the law of the circuit
would deprive the Board of the deference it is due under Chevron.227 The Board
is entitled to change its interpretation of the statute, and its changed position

likewise is entitled to Chevron deference. 228 Chevron would be thwarted if the
law of the circuit doctrine precluded a reviewing court from deferring to the
229
Board.
The Ninth Circuit narrowly limited the scope of its holding. Under the
Ninth Circuit's approach, only when the prior panel decision endorsed the
Board's view and when the decision did not hold its endorsement to be the only
reasonable reading of the statute should a departure from intracircuit stare deci-

sis occur. 230 In those circumstances, as the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, Chev23 1
ron mandates abandoning the law of the circuit.
In other circumstances, such as when a panel has refused to endorse the
Board's view and the issue later comes before the court with no change in the

Board's position, Chevron suggests, although it does not compel, rejection of
intracircuit stare decisis.2 32 When a court regards a prior panel decision as a

roadblock to reconsidering the agency's expert view, that position is at odds with
233
Chevron's respect for agency lawmaking.
A panel's decision is the reasoned view of the law by all or by a majority of
225. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Labor, 861 F.2d 1124, 1136 (9th
Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990). For a discussion of the Mesa Verde decision, see Comment, supra note 94, at 674-80.
226. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1134-35.
227. Id. at 1135.
228. Id.
229. Id. See supra notes 95-108 for discussion of Chevron.
230. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136.
231. Id.
232. When a reviewing court determines the Board's position is at odds with the statute, Chevron

certainly does not require the court to change its view. The Mesa Verde court presumably adhered
to a Chevron standard of review the first time around, and the holding of Chevron compels no additional deference. I do not contend that Chevron requires a departure from intracircuit stare decisis.
I do contend it suggests the need for flexible application of circuit law.
233. Professors Estreicher and Revesz rely on agencies' lawmaking functions and responsibility
for administering a nationally uniform statute as reasons why circuit courts are more likely to hold
en bane reviews or otherwise formally to overrule precedent when administration of a national statute is at issue. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 724-32; Estreicher & Revesz,
Reply, supra note 8, at 841-42. Allowing agencies to nonacquiesce is necessary so that opportunities
for reversal can arise. In response, authors Diller and Morawetz disagree that circuit courts are
readily willing to hold en bane hearings in cases involving agency lawmaking. Diller & Morawetz,
supra note 8, at 803-12; see also Kubitschek, supra note 8, at 424-25 (recognizing circuit courts do
not regularly overturn past decisions but instead rely on the law of the circuit to condemn nonacquiescence). Diller and Morawetz further contend that circuits do not and should not reconsider rules
of law established during review of agency decisions. DUller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 803-12.
Diller and Morawetz, however, focus on intracircuit nonacquiescence occurring in the face of venue
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the judges on the panel. It commands considerable respect. The panel, how-

2 34
ever, may (and probably does) have relatively little familiarity with labor law.

In deciding the issue before it, moreover, the panel is unlikely to be able to place

the issue into the broader perspective of the overall agency program. 235 Yet
certainty. Id. Thus, much of their argument extolling the virtues of intracircuit stare decisis is
inapplicable in the context of reviewing NLRB orders. See supra notes 217-20.
But in terms of describing the reality of circuit courts' treatment of precedent, Diller and
Morawetz, not Estreicher and Revesz, are correct. Intracircuit stare decisis is the traditionally followed rule, and en bane reversal of precedent is not occurring routinely. See supra notes 212-14.
Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 806; Solimine, Ideology and En Bane Review, 67 N.C.L. RaV.
29, 46 (1988).
Accordingly, because courts use the law of the circuit to deny enforcement of Board orders and
because this approach stymies development of a nationally uniform labor law, this Article advocates
that circuit courts discard the law of the circuit doctrine when confronting nonacquiescence by the
NLRB.
See also Note, The Politics of En Banc Review, 102 HARv. L. REV. 864, 878 n.71 (1989)
("Although the analogy to en bane review is problematic because lack of uniform decisionmaking
within a circuit is likely to become intolerable more quickly, the advantages of experimentation by
different three-judge panels nonetheless merits consideration."). In the NLRB context, the problems
of a lack of uniformity are minimized because of an inability of circuit law to guide the decisionmaking of the Board. Moreover, there is no district court involvement in lawmaking, so an absence of
guidance to lower courts is not implicated.
234. In view of the limited volume of labor cases, it is unrealistic to expect a particular
expertise in labor law from the members of the court. It is a fact of life that lawyers with
prior labor experience rarely receive appointments to circuit courts of appeals.... When
appearing before a federal circuit court, advocates should remember that labor law is a
subject that is largely unfamiliar to the professional deciders who will rule on the case.
Vance, supra note 76, at 39-40; see Kafker, supra note 5, at 148 (quoting Judge Vance); Meador,
supra note 165, at 619, 623. Professor Meador suggests that when an appellate court does not deal
with a "critical mass" of cases in a particular subject area, it may be unable to handle a case in that
area effectively. Id. at 619. As he states:
For an appellate court to deal coherently and constructively with a field of law over
time, the court needs more than a random case or a handful of cases annually.... If a
judge deals with only an occasional case in a particular field, there is a possibility that the
judge will either deal inadequately with the problem presented or will spend an inordinate
amount of time educating himself in the legal setting in which the case arises.
Id.
He identifies NLRB cases as fitting into this category. Id. at 623. While there were 561 appeals
from NLRB orders in 1987, several circuits handled fewer than 20. Id.
235. The episodic intervention of a particular panel of three of the nation's 156 circuit
judges, pressed to decide a particular point on particular facts, is unlikely to generate an
integrated view. If it cannot be pretended that the panel will have either the perspective or
the responsibility for integration, then accepting its ruling as a definitive point that must be
accommodated is inviting a crazy and tattered quilt.
Strauss, supra note 5, at 1115; see Koch, Confining JudicialAuthority Over AdministrativeAction, 49
Mo. L. REV. 183, 185 (1984).
Professor Strauss notes the outcome of a particular case can be "dramatically distorting of the
program as a whole." Strauss, supra note 5, at 1116 n.94. For example, he says, were the Board to

spend its resources complying with a circuit's ruling on one point, it would have to withdraw those
resources from elsewhere. Id. at 1115 n.88. Characterizing the judiciary as "the bull in the legal
china shop," Strauss asserts that there is a growing realization that "judicial lawmaking can serve as
a disruptive force when it occurs circuit by circuit, in competition with agencies that are able to
generate national standards." Id. at 1128-29.
Strauss's arguments are aimed at explaining Chevron and demonstrating how it helps achieve
national uniformity. See supra notes 128-30. While sympathetic to nonacquiescence, Strauss believes that once proper Chevron deference occurs, nonacquiescence is "far less acceptable." Strauss,
supra note 5, at 1122.
As set forth above, nonacquiescence in the face of venue choice is lawful. See supra notes 14172 and accompanying text. Strauss's arguments in defense of Chevron are also powerful, as explained herein, when made in favor of relaxing the law of the circuit.
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under the law of the circuit, the panel36decision governs future dispositions of
2
that issue throughout the jurisdiction.
If the Board thereafter considers and rejects the panel's view, its reasons for
rejection merit consideration that the law of the circuit now precludes. The
Board's expert reading is based on an integrated view of the statute.237 As the
entity Congress entrusted with national administration of the Act, the Board's
position deserves at least another look. 238 The Board, after all, shares in the
lawmaking process and has a mandate to fashion and to implement a nationally
uniform program. 239 When the usual benefits of stare decisis (e.g., certainty and
predictability for lawyers, litigants, and lower courts) already are missing,
agency expertise and lawmaking authority are powerful incentives for reconsideration of the issue by a subsequent panel.
Moreover, relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine provides a useful means
of ensuring that Chevron deference in fact occurs. Under the present system, the
Board theoretically can turn to the Supreme Court to enforce Chevron.24° As a
practical matter, that check often is of limited value.24 1 When the Court can
hear only 150 cases per year, it cannot be expected to correct all judicial overreaching. 242 Furthermore, the lower courts have been reluctant to follow Chev-

ron in reviewing Board orders.24 3 If one panel were free to disagree with
another panel's application of Chevron, then greater adherence to Chevron
through the threat of peer scrutiny could be expected. Additionally, any judicial
"mistakes" in applying Chevron would not freeze circuit law into a position at
odds with the Board's.
Chevron was a giant step toward uniformity in areas of national law. By
instructing circuit courts to defer to an agency's rational interpretation of a statute, the Supreme Court sought to restrain the lower courts and to allow the
national agency interpretation to prevail. 244 Routine application of the law of
the circuit doctrine undermines this value underlying Chevron.
245
Applying the law of the circuit results in a balkanization of federal law.
Labor law, supposedly uniform, takes on a different meaning and application in
236. This result, not surprisingly, leaves some judges uncomfortable. But the dislike of being
wedded to a position they had no part in formulating is balanced against judges' distaste for the en
banc process. J. HOWARD, supra note 213, at 217.
237. Strauss, supra note 5, at 1111, 1115.
238. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 724-32; Estreicher & Revesz,
Reply, supranote 8, at 841-42 (stressing the agency's national jurisdiction, as opposed to the regional
jurisdiction of the appeals courts, as a basis for validating nonacquiescence).
239. See Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence, supra note 8, at 724-32; Estreicher & Revesz,
Reply, supra note 8, at 841-42.
240. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1902 n.352.
241. Strauss, supra note 5, at 1105.

242. Id.
243. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
244. Pierce, supra note 87, at 313; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1119, 1126; see supra notes 130-33
and accompanying text.
245. Friendly, supra note 21, at 412-13; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1105.
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different parts of the country. 246 Under the present system, Board nonacquiescence serves only to obtain uniformity at the agency level.2 47
If the law of the circuit were disregarded, however, nonacquiescence would
lead to greater uniformity. Suppose, for example, that the Sixth Circuit rejects
the Board's statutory interpretation, but that the Seventh Circuit subsequently
accepts the Board's view. When the same issue again comes before the Sixth
Circuit, the law of the circuit would dictate a refusal to enforce the Board's
order. 248 But if the Sixth Circuit panel were free to disregard the prior panel
decision and to accept the Seventh Circuit's view, uniformity could more quickly
and easily be accomplished.
True, a subsequent Sixth Circuit panel would have conflicting views from
which to choose both within and outside the circuit, but to the extent it endorses
the second panel's approach, a more uniform law would evolve. At the least, no
circuit is wedded to a particular position on the basis of a prior panel decision
rejecting the Board's approach. While opposing views of federal labor law are

not eliminated, such opposition is not a foregone conclusion on the basis of regional precedent.
This approach gives labor law needed flexibility. While a court en banc can
overturn a panel decision, en banc proceedings are cumbersome and unwieldy. 249 En bancs also tend to polarize a court, and accordingly circuits avoid
246. See Meador, supra note 165, at 615-16. In some areas of federal law, this problem is not

significant. See R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 164. As Diller and Morawetz assert:

As long as parties can discern which circuit law applies to any given conduct, the parties
can shape their action to conform to legal standards. Furthermore, permitting circuits to
independently examine issues contributes to resolution of important legal questions on a
national basis. Accordingly, each circuit remains completely free to accept or reject the
reasoning of other courts of appeals. This mixture of uniformity and diversity strikes a
balance that permits legal issues to receive independent examination by a number of courts,
while at the same time maintaining a unitary rule of law in any given geographic location.
Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 805; see also Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit
Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 931 (1983)
(stating that since most litigants live and work in one circuit, they only have to conform to the law of
one circuit and are not troubled by conflicting circuit views).
DUller and Morawetz were discussing the benefits of circuit law in the context of review of social
security cases. Of course, as set forth earlier, parties cannot discern which circuit's law will apply in
labor cases. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. Moreover, having different rules of law
in different parts of the country encourages competition among the circuits and is destructive of
national labor policy. See supranote 165 and accompanying text. Thus, circuit law poses particular
problems in the labor law context, rendering Diller and Morawetz's arguments of little force.
A survey of labor law practitioners revealed concern over balkanization:
Lawyers and clients alike are willing to accept the fact that the law is uncertain and that
outcomes cannot be predicted because the legal rule is unsettled or the facts undetermined.
But they have difficulty accepting the fact that the outcome depends on where the case is
heard or who hears it. They are not troubled by state law differing from state to state, but
they are troubled by federal law differing from circuit to circuit. Though the practical
problems created may be the same, differences in state law are viewed as unfortunate, while
differences in federal law are viewed as unseemly or unfair.

Summers,

REPORT TO HRUSKA COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE
SYSTEM, 67 F.R.D. 195, 374 (1975). The Hruska Commission recommended establishment of a

national
247.
248.
249.

court of appeals. Id. at 199, 237. This controversial recommendation was never adopted.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
J. HOWARD, supra note 213, at 217; Meador, supra note 165, at 605-06.
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them when possible.2 50 Because of the unlikelihood of an en banc overruling, a
panel decision thus effectively freezes the law of the circuit. The Board, however, is empowered to shift its position in response to its experience or to the
political process. 251 If circuit courts are denied the flexibility to approve chang25 2
ing Board views, the Board's own flexibility is stymied.

For example, suppose the Fifth Circuit endorses the Board's view of the
statute. The Board later changes its mind, and its new position is endorsed by
the Third and Fourth Circuits. If the Fifth Circuit is compelled by the law of
the circuit to stand by its prior decision and to deny enforcement in accordance
with the law of the circuit, an unnecessary lack of uniformity in federal labor
law has been created. 253 If a Fifth Circuit panel were free to look at the issue
anew, it might well agree with the Board and its sister circuits. Thus, freedom
from the law of the circuit can aid in obtaining national uniformity.
Adherence to the law of the circuit, moreover, promotes forum shopping. 254 Many, if not most, parties to Board proceedings have numerous circuits from which to choose in selecting a reviewing court.255 Using the law of
the circuit, aggrieved parties can shop for a circuit whose law is hospitable to
their positions. 256 This encourages appeals by the losing party, who has the
257
ability to select a favorable forum.
If the courts relaxed the law of the circuit, however, a party could not be
certain of circuit law. A prior panel's rejection of the Board's position would
not guarantee how a subsequent panel in that circuit would rule. A subsequent
panel would remain free to accept the Board's view over that of a sister panel,
eliminating the opportunity to select a forum with favorable law.
Finally, if the courts released themselves from the constraints of the law of
the circuit doctrine, they would reduce the Board/court tensions caused by nonacquiescence. As previously discussed, the Board should not be bound by circuit law in making its decisions and is free to reject the law of any circuit, even
one likely to review a particular case. 258 Under the present system, however, the
reviewing court is not free to "respectfully disagree" with a prior panel, but
rather it is bound to follow that decision. 259 This anomaly, that the Board in its
250. J. HOWARD, supra note 213, at 217; Meador, supra note 165, at 605.06; Wald, supra note
214, at 488.
251. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

252. See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124,
1135 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
253. Id.
254. Friendly, supra note 21, at 412; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1105.

255. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
256. When petitions are filed in more than one circuit, the first to file controls, unless competing
petitions are filed within 10 days of the Board's order. In that circumstance, the reviewing court is
determined by lottery. Pub. L. No. 100-236, 101 Stat. 1731, 1731 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2112(a) (1982)). This random selection process precludes forum shopping only when competing
petitions are filed. Moreover, it increases the uncertainty in predicting which circuit will review a
case. Modjeska, supra note 8, at 417.
257. Ferguson & Bordoni, supra note 8, at 216.
258. See supra notes 141-70 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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decisionmaking process can ignore precedent the reviewing court cannot, exac2 6°
erbates conflict between the Board and the courts.
The Board cannot ease tension over this anomaly and remain true to its
statutory responsibilities. In contrast, the courts have the power to remove the
Board-circuit court friction. 26 1 The circuit courts should relinquish the law of
the circuit when reviewing Board orders; then a panel, like the Board, could
reject circuit precedent with which it "respectfully disagrees."
The end result of this approach is a more nationalized law of labor relations. In essence, circuit boundaries often would be unimportant when Board
orders are reviewed. A panel would be free to prefer the view of the Board or of
another circuit over the view of a sister panel.
Differences in statutory interpretation among the circuits inevitably will occur. Moreover, under this approach, differences may occur within a circuit.
Conflicting panel decisions, however, are no more intolerable than conflicting
circuit views, because circuit law, given the broad venue provisions governing
review, cannot be used or relied upon to shape employer, union, or individual
action, or to govern Board proceedings or rulings. A coherent body of circuit
law rejecting the Board's position lends no stability to a national labor law.
It is not necessarily unhealthy that differing statutory interpretations could
exist within and among the circuits. As the Court recognized in Mendoza, significant advantages flow from percolation. 262 Percolation is useful, whether it
occurs within or among the circuits. 263 Additionally, the appellate courts would
have greater freedom to work out their own disagreements. 2 6 Conflicting views
that continued to exist would be more representative of circuit judges as a whole,
as opposed to conflicts engendered by a single panel decision that froze circuit
law.
Uniformity is further enhanced by recognizing that the law of the circuit
should apply when the first panel within a circuit to address a particular issue
has endorsed the Board's view, and the Board is again seeking enforcement of a
260. Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence,supra note 8, at 742.
261. Intracircuit stare decisis is a judge-made doctrine and thus is judicially modifiable. J. MURPHY & R. RUETER, supra note 203, at 104-05. Maranville, supra note 8, at 500. The circuit judges,

moreover, are free to revise their internal operating procedures. See Solimine, supranote 233, at 35
n.28; FED. R. App. P. 47.
262. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
263. "[A] difficult question is more likely to be answered correctly if it is allowed to engage the
attention of different sets of judges deciding factually different cases than if it is answered finally by
the first panel to consider it." R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 163, quoted in Estreicher & Revesz,

Reply, supra note 8, at 835 n.24. That these different sets of judges sit within a circuit, as well as
among the circuits, does not make their participation in the dialogue or contributions toward the
development of national law any less valuable.
264. Under our federal system, the Supreme Court is empowered to resolve conflicts that develop among the circuits, but its capacity to do so is limited. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at
809-10; Friendly, supra note 21, at 412; Strauss, supra note 5, at 1105. Thus, reliance on the
Supreme Court to resolve all intercircuit conflicts is not well grounded.

It is true that the circuits themselves can harmonize the law by reversing position. Presently,
however, as Diller and Morawetz point out, "the rules are structured to make departures from prior
decisions unusual events requiring the attention of the full court." Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8,
at 805 n.18. Were the circuits free from the constraints of such rules, conflicts could be more easily
ironed out. See R. POSNER, supra note 93, at 256.
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subsequent order. In other words, when the Board's position has been upheld
by a circuit panel and the issue subsequently is brought before the court by an
aggrieved party seeking a departure from circuit law, the court should follow the
general rule of intracircuit stare decisis. In this situation, no special circumstance exists that warrants a departure from the law of the circuit.26 5 In those
cases, which do not involve nonacquiescence, the rationale underlying an abandonment of circuit law is inapplicable. The agency's expert view has been accepted, and the agency can count on enforcement of its view in administering its
program. Were circuit law always open to reconsideration, even when it conformed to the agency's expert view, uniformity and stability would be undermined, not enhanced. Such a result is at odds with the reasons for recognizing
an exception in the first place. Thus, the exception advocated here to intracir-

cuit stare decisis must be narrowly drawn to advance the goals it is designed to
achieve.
Additionally, certainty and predictability in the enforcement of Boardmade law do guide the actions of those within the Board's jurisdiction. When
unions, employers, individuals, and their counsel know that the circuits with the
potential to review a Board order accept the Board's position, that knowledge is
a powerful incentive for conforming their conduct to the law as administered
and applied by the agency. This underlying benefit of intracircuit stare decisis
must be retained. Accordingly, a review procedure that relaxes the law of the
circuit only in cases of Board nonacquiescence promotes a nationally uniform
labor law.
This national appellate approach avoids balkanization, exchanging it for a
panel's freedom to fall into line with a view outside the circuit that favors the
agency's nationally uniform program. A reasoned step toward uniformity is
worth taking in the area of labor relations, where the need for a uniform law is
266
particularly acute.
265. Admittedly, this approach skews the development of the law in favor of the agency's position. Given the agency's expertise and its primary role in developing national labor policy, as recognized in Chevron, this advantage is merited. However, I do not go so far as to suggest that when one
panel has rejected the Board's position, a subsequent panel decision in favor of the agency thereafter
should bind the circuit to the Board's view. Where conflicting views exist, they should be permitted
to percolate. If subsequent decisions routinely endorse the Board, an en banc hearing could remove
the conflict by overruling the first panel decision.
266. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court long has recognized
the importance of uniformity in labor law through its preemption cases. See White, Section 301's
Preemption of State Law Claims: A Modelfor Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REV. 377 (1990); Zimmerman,
supra note 27, at 4.
See also Meador, supra note 165, at 617-21. Professor Meador, who advocates the creation of
nonregional appellate courts, discusses seven factors that identify areas of the law where uniformity
is particularly important. His factors are as follows:
1. Is there a nationwide federal program administered by a single federal agency?
2. Are multi-circuit actors frequently involved in the area being regulated?
3. Would regionalization lead to undesirable results?
4. Are there strong local interests that outweigh national interests? For example, as Professor Meador points out, protecting marine life is not of similar importance to all areas of the

country.
5. Is there a dearth of cases in a particular circuit or circuits?
6. Is it easy to define the particular subject matter at issue?

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

At some point, however, a circuit reasonably could conclude that a law of
the circuit should be formed. When panel decisions within a circuit routinely
refuse to enforce the Board's position or find the Board's position to be the only
permissible reading of the statute, the circuit should hold an en banc hearing.
Once the en banc court formally rejects the Board's view of the statute or endorses it as the only reasonable reading, the court then should rely upon the law
of the circuit in future cases. This circuit law, however, could neither restrain
agency lawmaking nor justify remedial measures against the Board. 267 It would
be used to dispose of the Board's enforcement action without further
consideration.
Conflicting panel decisions within a circuit should not automatically result
in en banc review. Because circuit law cannot provide certainty or stability to
actors within the circuit, disagreement within the circuit can and should be tolerated. Moreover, when circuit judges vigorously disagree on whether congressional intent is clear or on whether agency action is irrational, such
26 8
disagreements should not be stifled by creating a binding circuit law.
In short, en banc establishment of circuit law should be the exception, not
the rule, in reviewing Board orders in the face of nonacquiescence. The benefits
of increasing exposure to agency expertise, of providing flexibility to more easily
achieve uniformity, of limiting forum shopping, and of eliminating tension between the Board and courts over the binding effect of circuit law rarely should
be outweighed by the desire for a "law of the circuit."
B. Recognizing the Drawbacks
An approach to judicial review that allows one panel to reject a prior
panel's position is not without its costs. First, an increase in judicial workload
would occur. 269 When a panel is not bound by circuit law but is expected to
examine an issue for itself, courts will expend additional time and energy on
Board cases. 270 Labor cases, however, represent a small percentage of appellate
7. Is the overall volume of cases in the subject matter particularly high?
Id. Professor Meador concludes that each of these factors supports taking review of NLRB orders

away from the regional appellate courts, in order to achieve greater uniformity. Id. at 621.
Much of the desired uniformity is obtainable without such a radical step and without a need for

congressional intervention by discarding routine reliance on intracircuit stare decisis. Moreover,
uniformity is obtainable without losing the benefits of percolation or without creating a specialized
court, which some have criticized as unworkable or undesirable. See R. POSNER, supra note 93, at

150.
267. Although circuit law would be settled, the Board should not be punished for adhering to its
nationally uniform view of the statute. "While a single court of appeals can settle the rights of
parties to a lawsuit, it should not be able to unilaterally stymie the prospects for uniformity in
administration of Federal law while an agency is reasonably attempting to obtain the nationwide
validation of its position." Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 8, at 842.
268. It is these difficult issues that are most in need of the benefits of percolation. See R. PosNER, supra note 93, at 163.
269. The workload of the federal courts is growing by leaps and bounds. See generally Solimine,

supra note 233, at 41 (reporting a more than 700% increase in cases filed over approximately the last
25 years).

270. Conserving judicial resources is one of the justifications for the law of the circuit doctrine,
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court caseloads. 27 1 Most of these cases, moreover, are "substantial evidence"

cases, in which the court determines whether the Board's factual determinations
are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.272 The bulk of
the cases implicates neither nonacquiescence nor the law of the circuit, as factual
issues only are presented. Other cases involve a review of a Board position that
the court previously has accepted at first exposure. Those cases neither involve a
nonacquiescence issue nor do they justify any departure from the law of the
circuit. 273 Rather, national uniformity and a stability of Board law are en274
hanced when the circuit routinely adheres to the Board's position.
What remains is the narrow category of cases involving statutory interpretation or policy choices on which the Board and a panel of the reviewing circuit
court have disagreed. Asking federal judges to rethink these issues, bearing in
mind the agency's expertise and responsibility for the entire program, imposes a
justifiable and modest increase in judicial workloads.
Perhaps more troubling is the possibility of increased tension within a circuit. The comity principle that underlies stare decisis is as important in reviewing Board orders as it is in other areas of the law. If intracircuit stare decisis
were to be lifted in this narrow category of cases, however, one panel's disagreement with another's view of the law would not involve the extraordinary flouting
of precedent that such conflicts now represent. Instead, just as a panel currently
feels free to reject another circuit's view, similar treatment of prior panel decisions would be a recognized and accepted part of the review system.
Finally, this departure from intracircuit stare decisis in reviewing Board
orders will not lead to a wholesale retreat from the law of the circuit doctrine
when reviewing agency lawmaking in general. It is the NLRA':s judicial review
provisions that make the law of the circuit of little use in labor cases. 275 Under

statutes in which one circuit reviews all cases arising within the jurisdiction,
certainty and predictability of circuit law enable litigants to conform their conduct, structure their affairs, or make litigation decisions according to circuit law.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Whenever that doctrine is abandoned, an increase in
workloads undeniably occurs.

271. See Meador, supranote 165, at 604, 624. According to his figures, 561 appeals from NLRB
decisions were filed in 1987, out of over 37,000 total appeals. See also Vance, supra note 76, at 39

(noting that "(1]abor cases constitute a surprisingly small percentage of the total work load in most
circuits").
272. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1704 (C.Morris 2d ed. 1983).
273. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. Additionally, the factors that make uniformity particularly important in Board cases are not present in reviewing all administrative action.
See supra note 266.

These attributes should be considered in determining how judicial review is best accomplished.
As Professor Winter noted, judicial review should depend on an evaluation of an agency's functions:
That evaluation can be made in large part only by examining each agency individually, for
each has its unique characteristics and its unique functions, determined by the nature of the
matters to be regulated, the private interests involved, the character of the basic legislation,
and the structure of the agency itself.
Winter, supra note 80, at 53.
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In those cases, adherence to the law of the circuit satisfies important goals. 276
Similarly, when review of agency action is confided at the first level to the district court, a law of the circuit is needed to guide lower court decisionmaking. 277
These attributes of intracircuit stare decisis are missing in the NLRB context and, as discussed above, justify relaxing the law of the circuit doctrine. But
the reasons for relaxing it in this context are not so widespread as to make the
law of the circuit doctrine generally inapplicable to all agency review actions. 278
CONCLUSION

Nonacquiescence by the NLRB has become a source of real tension between the Board and the courts. This Article suggests the judiciary bears responsibility for this tension on two fronts. First, by failing to observe Chevron,
the reviewing courts increase the Board's need to nonacquiesce. 279 Chevron
commands the lower courts to give considerable judicial deference to the
Board's policy choices. Whether these policy choices are made through statutory gap-filing or through construction of an ambiguous NLRA provision, the
Board's position must be upheld if rational. When a reviewing court fails to
defer to the Board's rational policy choices, it creates the opportunity for the
Board thereafter to nonacquiesce. Were the courts to adhere more carefully to
Chevron, nonacquiescence would be reduced.
Second, by not recognizing the lawfulness of Board nonacquiescence at
both the agency and appellate review levels, the judiciary unfairly accuses the
Board of acting outside the law, when it simply is exercising its statutory authority. Board nonacquiescence at the agency level is lawful; the broad venue provisions of the NLRA render no circuit's law "controlling" for purposes of agencylevel decisionmaking. When the Board nonacquiesces at the appellate review
level, its litigation conduct is shielded by its responsibility for interpreting and
2 80
applying a rationally uniform law.
This Article asks the judiciary, however, to step beyond acknowledging
nonacquiescence's lawfulness. It asks the courts to consider what place "circuit
law" has in developing a national labor law. Upon finding a limited usefulness

to the law of the circuit doctrine in cases involving Board nonacquiescence and
upon recognizing benefits to its demise, it advocates a relaxation of intracircuit
stare decisis when reviewing Board orders.
This solution admittedly is not perfect in an era of expanding judicial work276. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 8, at 803-11.

277. For example, district courts review decisions of the Social Security Administration. See
supra note 55.
278. This is not to suggest that NLRB orders are the exclusive candidate for this approach.

There may be other agencies, operating under similarly broad venue provisions and for whose programs national uniformity is critical, that deserve such treatment. This Article, however, focuses on
the NLRB and analyzes the usefulness of the law of the circuit when reviewing Board orders. It
leaves to others whether this analysis can be expanded to encompass any other agency.
279. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 143-98 and accompanying text.
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loads. 281 And, certainly, other possible avenues for achieving labor law uniformity exist. Creation of a national court or an intercircuit tribunal 282 to
resolve intercircuit conflicts or formation of a specialized labor court, for example, are proposals that have been debated off and on for years. 283 As national
programs become more balkanized by circuit law, the push for uniformity will
grow. 284 But to date, Congress has not responded.
Drastic restructuring, however, may not be necessary. The judiciary has
the means for reducing geographical differences in our national labor policy.
The "judicial bull in the legal china shop," 28 5 accordingly, should take itself by
the horns and renounce its unnecessary adherence to the law of the circuit when
confronting Board nonacquiescence.

281. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
282. See, eg., COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195,
208-47 (1975); Levin, AddingAppellate Capacity to the FederalSystem: A NationalCourt of Appeals
or an Inter-CircuitTribunal, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 11-21 (1982).
283. See, eg., Meador, supra note 165. Professor Meador suggests the use of non-regional appellate courts to handle particular subject areas, including review of NLRB orders, or alternatively
suggests the elimination of the circuits, with a unitary appeals court.
284. Meador, supra note 165, at 605-06, 615-16; see Sweeping Changes in Federal Judiciary
Urged by FederalCourts Study Committee, 58 U.S.L.W. 2599 (1990). That uniformity presently
does not exist was highlighted recently by Justice White. Dissenting from a denial of certiorari in a
case involving intercircuit conflicts, Justice White noted that in the most recent term of the Court he
dissented 48 times from a denial of certiorari in cases involving conflicts among the circuits. Beau-

lieu v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990) (White, J., dissenting).
285. This colorful phrase was coined by Professor Strauss. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1129,
quoted supra note 235.

